Strategic Information Acquisition in Models of Settlement and Litigation

由于大多数诉讼从未进入审判阶段，关于和解经济学和诉讼经济学的文献越来越多。在基本经济模型中，各方之间的信息分配是不对称的，解决方案的时间顺序是外生指定的。与这些努力相反，Daughety和Reinganum的新工作旨在通过允许双方影响信息的可得性和提议的时间，更好地考虑谈判和解决的现实。利用博弈论衍生的模型，这些调查人员研究了信息交换的条件以及信息对和解的影响。本研究特别关注与民事案件审前议价中信息使用有关的程序和制度设计问题。扩展模型允许自愿披露信息，不确定的责任和损害赔偿，以及战略性地使用发现过程。此外，它还允许分析审前谈判在法庭上作为可采证据的影响，责任和损害赔偿规则对和解过程的影响，以及被告反诉和针对被告的多重诉讼对和解过程的影响。在概念化的过程中，这一模型有望探索比迄今为止在诉讼和和解方面存在的更丰富的信息假设和更广泛的程序手段。在现实的和解条件下，双方的信息交换和战略决策都受到各种发现和责任规则的约束。这项工作有望捕捉这些动态，并超越审前程序的高度程式化模型。

Since most lawsuits never go to trial, there is a growing literature on the economics of settlement as well as litigation. In the basic economic models, information is asymmetrically distributed among the parties and the timing sequence of settlement proposals is specified exogenously. In contrast to such efforts, new work by Daughety and Reinganum aims to take better account of the realities of negotiation and settlement by allowing both parties to influence the availability of information and the timing of proposals. Using models derived from game theory, these investigators examine the conditions under which information will be exchanged and the impact of that information on settlement. The research specifically focuses on procedural and institutional design issues relating to the use of information in pre-trial bargaining in civil cases. The extended model allows for voluntary disclosure of information, for uncertain liability and damages, and for the strategic use of the discovery process. Also, it permits analyzing the effects of making pre-trial negotiations admissible evidence in court, the effects of liability and damage rules on the settlement process, and the effects on the settlement process of countersuits by the defendant and multiple suits against the defendant. As conceptualized, this modelling promises to explore both a richer set of informational assumptions and a broader range of procedural devices than heretofore exists on litigation and settlement. In real-life conditions for settlement, exchange of information and strategic decisions by both parties are subject to a variety of discovery and liability rules. This effort holds promise of capturing these dynamics and moving beyond the highly stylized models of the pre-trial process.