Collaborative Research on International and Domestic Determinants of Legal and Institutional Change in Japan

本项目关注日本政府的法律和制度结构如何影响政策制定和执行。分析方法以理性选择的委托-代理视角为指导。通过理论和实证研究，本研究挑战了“文化主义”理论，认为日本官僚主义，更具体地说，日本官僚文化，对日本的政策制定具有单一而显著的影响。该研究中的一个有效假设是，“文化”是一个不如“委托-代理”理论所探讨的特定理性考虑有效的解释变量。该研究基于过去40年的时间序列分析，考察了国际贸易和国内选举的变化对预算模式、监管政策、法院判决以及官僚和司法职业道路的影响。通过澄清政治制度结构并测试这种结构对日本国内和国际政策的影响，本研究将确定日本政策制定和执行的决定因素，以及这些决定因素在外国压力下如何变化。它还将使委托代理理论超越其美国根基，走向一个更加全球化的模式。因此，它将揭示理解党的领导人角色的新方法，委托代理监督的新形式，以及这种监督对司法独立的新影响。

This project focuses on the way that the legal and institutional structure of government in Japan shapes policymaking and enforcement. The analytic approach is guided by a rational-choice principal-agent perspective. Undertaking both theoretical and empirical work, the research challenges "culturalist" theories holding that Japanese bureaucracy, and more specifically Japanese bureaucratic culture, has a singular and salient effect on Japanese policy-making. A working hypothesis in the study is that "culture" is a less effective explanatory variable than particular rational concerns explored under the rubric of "principal-agent" theory. Based on time-series analyses over four decades, the study examines the impact that changes in international trade and domestic elections have had on budget patterns, regulatory policies, court decisions, and bureaucratic and judicial career paths. By clarifying the institutional structure of politics and testing the impact that this structure has on Japanese domestic and international policies, the study will identify the determinants of Japanese policymaking and enforcement and how those change under foreign pressure. It will also move principal-agent theory beyond its U.S.-based roots to a more global model. As such, it will uncover new ways of understanding the role of party leaders, new forms of principal-agent monitoring, and new implications that such monitoring poses for judicial independence.