Collaborative Research: The Design of Bankruptcy Procedures

决定投资政策、清算政策的一个关键因素， 金融危机的后果是 管理破产。 破产规则影响金融公司 痛苦有两种方式。 首先，很明显，它们会影响 破产程序的结果。 其次，他们建立了 替代破产解决方案，从而影响 这些定居点的性质。 两种非正式谈判的可能结果 谈判和正式破产，反过来，影响可用性 投资资金的种类和投资股权持有人 将追求。 更具体地说，考虑不周的破产规则 这可能会使投资者无法获得公平的回报， 在投资经济上可行的情况下。 还有， 破产规则可能鼓励或阻止效率低下的 投资. 最后，破产制度影响的程度， 哪些公司被迫清算资产，即使在“去 关注“资产价值高于未偿债务”。 研究的目的是指导政策辩论 围绕破产提出了一些最佳的特点， 破产法基于这些考虑。 研究方法是新颖的，它如何看待最优破产 法律作为一个因素，在更广泛的问题， 金融合同。 这些合同规定了资源如何 在投资者和公司之间分配。 实际财务 合同通常只规定（可能是或有）支付给 投资者 关于违反约定承诺的规则 事实上，通常在合同中没有明确规定。 它们一般包含在法律的制度中，并隐含在 每一份合同的一部分。 例如，债务合同规定 债务持有人的投资，具体付款，他是 有资格，和契约限制债务人的行为。 破产法规定了一个程序，如果承诺， 如果没有付款或违反契约。 鉴于 在这方面，安全设计将被视为包括 明确的承诺和程序，以遵循的情况下 违约，最佳破产规则将作为 总体合同设计问题。

A key factor in determining investment policy, liquidation policy, and the consequences of financial distress is the set of rules governing bankruptcy. Bankruptcy rules affect firms in financial distress in two ways. First, it is obvious that they affect the outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding. Second, they establish the alternative to an out-of-bankruptcy settlement and so affect the nature of such settlements. The likely outcomes of both informal bargaining and formal bankruptcy, in turn, affect the availability of funds for investment and the types of investments equity holders will pursue. More specifically, poorly conceived bankruptcy rules may make it impossible for investors to earn a fair return, even in situations where the investment is economically viable. Also, bankruptcy rules may encourage or discourage inefficient investments. Finally the bankruptcy regime affects the extent to which firms are forced to liquidate assets even when the "going concern" value of the assets is higher than the outstanding debt. The purpose of the research is to guide the policy debate surrounding bankruptcy by suggesting some features of an optimal bankruptcy law based on these considerations. The research method is novel in how it regards optimal bankruptcy law as one element in the broader problem of designing optimal financial contracts. Such contracts specify how resources are to be allocated between investors and firms. Actual financial contracts usually stipulate only (possibly contingent) payments to investors. The rules governing the breach of stipulated promises are, in fact, typically not specified in the contract explicitly. They are generally contained in the legal system and are implicitly a part of every contract. For example, debt contracts specify the debtholder's investment, the specific payments to which he is entitled, and covenants restricting the debtor's behavior. Bankruptcy law provides a procedure to be followed if the promised payments are not made or if the covenants are violated. In view of this concern, security design will be examined as including both explicit promises and the procedures to be followed in case of breach, and optimal bankruptcy rules will be derived as part of an overall contract design problem.