Collaborative Research--Corporate Governance and Takeovers

最近，公司治理规则和收购过程对相关公司投资者福利的影响，以及对整个社会福利的影响，在学术和公众辩论中都占据了突出地位。公司治理规则通过各种反收购手段的可用性和有效性直接或间接地影响收购发生的难易程度。这个项目发展了一个强大的公司治理和公司融资的一般理论。这一理论被用来得出关于公司控制和收购的许多重要问题的新见解，这些问题一直被经济学家所忽视。为什么大多数公司章程规定控制权的争夺是由简单的（50%）多数票决定的？为什么投票权从未与债券挂钩，尽管这样做从来都不违法？为什么投票权一般不分配给优先股？为什么最普遍的普通股投票权分配方式是将投票权与现金流要求成比例？特别是，拥有不同投票权的普通股的福利后果是什么？如何同时解释证券现金流特征的设计及其投票权分配？也就是说，通常观察到的证券，有比例表决权的普通股和无表决权的债券是否可以内生衍生？调查上述问题对资本结构的影响是什么？特别是，对证券设计及其投票权的解释是否也能解释观察到的资本结构规律？强制披露收购意向是最优的吗？如果是，在收购过程的哪个阶段？特别是，要求在累计5%股权后进行披露的规定是否应该修改？无论是根据公司章程还是法规，现任管理层是否应该被允许拥有投票权？企业或监管机构是否应该禁止或鼓励使用定向股票回购（绿色邮件）、排他性收购要约、停滞协议、毒丸和黄金降落伞等反收购手段？

Recently the effect of corporate governance rules and the takeover process on the welfare of investors in the companies involved, as well as on that of society in general, has figured prominently in both academic and public debate. Corporate governance rules affect the ease with which takeovers occur both directly and indirectly through the availability and effectiveness of various antitakeover devices. This project develops a powerful general theory of corporate governance and corporate finance. The theory is used to derive new insights into a number of important issues about corporate control and takeovers that have been neglected by economists. The following specific questions are addressed: Why do most corporate charters provide that control contests are decided by a simple (50%) majority vote? Why are voting rights never attached to bonds even though it has never been illegal to do so? Why are voting rights generally not assigned to preferred stock? Why is the most prevalent assignment of voting rights to common stock that of assigning votes proportional to the cash flow claims? In particular, what are the welfare consequences of having classes of common stock with disparate voting rights? How can one explain simultaneously the design of the cash flow characteristics of a security and its voting rights assignment? That is, can the commonly observed securities, common stock with proportional votes and nonvoting bonds, be derived endogenously? What are the implications for capital structure of investigating the above issues? In particular, can an explanation of the design of securities and their voting rights also explain observed capital structure regularities? Is mandatory disclosure of intent to take over a firm optimal and, if so, at what point in the takeover process? In particular, should the rule requiring disclosure after accumulating a 5% equity stake be modified? Should incumbent management be allowed, either by the corporate charter or by regulations, to hold voting rights? Should corporations or regulatory agencies prohibit or encourage the use of such antitakeover devices as targeted share repurchase (greenmail), exclusionary tender offers, standstill agreements, poison pills, and golden parachutes?