Collaborative Research--Corporate Governance and Takeovers

近年来，公司治理规则的效果和 收购过程对公司投资者福利的影响 参与，以及对社会的一般，已经计算 在学术和公共辩论中都很突出。 企业 治理规则影响收购发生的难易程度， 直接或间接地通过可用性， 各种反收购手段的有效性。 这个项目 发展了一个强大的公司治理的一般理论， 企业融资 该理论被用来获得新的见解 一些关于公司控制权的重要问题， 被经济学家忽视的收购。 以下是具体的问题：为什么大多数 公司章程规定，控制权之争由 简单多数票（50%）？ 为什么投票权从来不附加 即使这样做从来都不违法 为什么 投票权一般不分配给优先股？ 为什么 最普遍的普通股投票权分配 分配与现金流索赔成比例的投票权？ 在 特别是，有了阶级， 不同投票权的普通股吗 一个人怎么能 同时说明现金流的设计 证券的特征及其表决权分配？ 也就是说，可以共同观察证券，普通股与 比例投票和无投票权债券，是内生的吗？ 调查对资本结构有何影响 上述问题？ 特别是，可以解释 证券的设计及其投票权也解释了 观察资本结构？ 是强制披露 意图收购一家公司的最佳时机，如果是的话， 在收购过程中？ 特别是，规则 要求在积累5%的股权后进行披露， 修改？ 如果现任管理层被允许， 公司章程或法规规定，持有投票权？ 公司或监管机构应该禁止还是鼓励 采用定向回购等反收购手段 （绿邮）、排他性投标报价、停顿期协议、 毒药和黄金降落伞

Recently the effect of corporate governance rules and the takeover process on the welfare of investors in the companies involved, as well as on that of society in general, has figured prominently in both academic and public debate. Corporate governance rules affect the ease with which takeovers occur both directly and indirectly through the availability and effectiveness of various antitakeover devices. This project develops a powerful general theory of corporate governance and corporate finance. The theory is used to derive new insights into a number of important issues about corporate control and takeovers that have been neglected by economists. The following specific questions are addressed: Why do most corporate charters provide that control contests are decided by a simple (50%) majority vote? Why are voting rights never attached to bonds even though it has never been illegal to do so? Why are voting rights generally not assigned to preferred stock? Why is the most prevalent assignment of voting rights to common stock that of assigning votes proportional to the cash flow claims? In particular, what are the welfare consequences of having classes of common stock with disparate voting rights? How can one explain simultaneously the design of the cash flow characteristics of a security and its voting rights assignment? That is, can the commonly observed securities, common stock with proportional votes and nonvoting bonds, be derived endogenously? What are the implications for capital structure of investigating the above issues? In particular, can an explanation of the design of securities and their voting rights also explain observed capital structure regularities? Is mandatory disclosure of intent to take over a firm optimal and, if so, at what point in the takeover process? In particular, should the rule requiring disclosure after accumulating a 5% equity stake be modified? Should incumbent management be allowed, either by the corporate charter or by regulations, to hold voting rights? Should corporations or regulatory agencies prohibit or encourage the use of such antitakeover devices as targeted share repurchase (greenmail), exclusionary tender offers, standstill agreements, poison pills, and golden parachutes?