Limited Contracting in General Equlibrium Models

为什么在市场经济中，资本所有者 总是雇佣劳动力？ 古典一般均衡理论是 在这个问题上保持沉默：谁控制一家公司， 资本的所有者，劳动力的所有者，或者其他人， 简单地选择公司生产中的价值最大化点 可能性集 在市场经济中， 企业所有者的责任。 我们也看到破产， 公司经常重组，控制权转移到新的 所有者和有时公司被清算。 该项目开发 破产、重组和清算 在均衡中发生，并且对资本家来说是最优的 拥有并控制公司 目前的定量一般均衡模型的业务 从金融中介中抽象出来的周期。 一个被广泛持有的 对商业周期的看法是， 不会直接对总产量产生很大影响 可能最终会产生巨大的综合后果， 与金融中介系统的互动。 为 比如19世纪末20世纪初的金融危机 几个世纪之后，产量严重下降， 就业人数似乎太多， 技术冲击。 这个项目的贡献来自于 第一个数量型一般均衡的发展 金融中介的商业周期模型 发挥着核心作用。 这些模型用于重新评估 货币和财政政策的影响，包括各种 有关金融中介的法规和政策。 该模型的一个扩展版本探讨了金融危机， 循环 本项目的第三部分评估了货币和财政 在代理人之间签订有限合同的政策。 定量 建立了一个具有名义工资合同的模型，并给出了其策略 的影响进行了探讨。 还开发了一个模型， 收入分配与税收制度相互作用。 这些模型 定量研究了股权与资本市场的互动关系 税收政策设计中的效率目标。

Why in market economies is it the owners of capital that almost always hire labor? Classical general equilibrium theory is silent on this question: whoever controls a firm whether it be the owners of capital or the owners of labor, or someone else, simply picks the value maximizing point in that firm's production possibility set. In market economies we typically see limited liability of the owners of firms. We also see bankruptcies and often firms are reorganized and control is transferred to new owners and sometimes firms are liquidated. This project develops a model in which bankruptcy, reorganization, and liquidation occur in equilibrium and in which it is optimal for capitalists to own and control the firm. Currently quantitative general equilibrium models of the business cycle abstract from financial intermediation. One widely held view of the business cycle is that shocks to the economy which do not directly have a large effect on aggregate production possibilities may end up having large aggregate consequences due to interactions with the financial intermediation system. For example, the financial crises of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were followed by severe declines in output and employment which seem far too large to be accounted for by technology shocks. The contribution of this project comes from the development of the first quantitative general equilibrium model of the business cycle in which financial intermediation plays a central role. These models are used to reassess the effects of monetary and fiscal policy, including various regulations and policies with regard to financial intermediation. An extended version of the model explores financial crises over the cycle. The third part of this project evaluates monetary and fiscal policy with limited contracting among agents. A quantitative model with nominal wage contracts is developed and its policy implications are explored. A model is also developed in which income distribution interacts with the tax system. These models are used to quantitatively study the interact ion between equity and efficiency goals in the design of tax policies.