Interlocking Directorates and Interfirm Business Transactions, 1981-1992

9320930 Mizruchi这是一项关于美国大公司与其董事会代表的公司进行商业交易的程度的研究。借鉴资源依赖视角、政治社会学和代理理论，本研究开发了一个模型来预测公司与董事会有关联的公司做生意的条件。利用美国证券交易委员会1978年的一项裁决，该裁决要求公司披露与其董事会成员公司的业务关系，该模型将使用1981年(存在可靠商业交易数据的第一年)至1992年期间美国最大的500家制造业公司的数据进行测试。由于设计是纵向的，这项研究将允许研究一系列涉及互惠因果关系的问题，包括：(1)贷款银行家在公司董事会中的存在对公司获得后续融资的影响；(2)这种融资来自董事会成员机构的程度；(3)贷款银行在贷款后被任命进入公司董事会的程度；以及(4)与贷款银行的关系是否比与非贷款银行的关系在意外中断时更有可能被取代。这项研究将对经济社会学、政治社会学以及一般社会学理论的发展和检验做出贡献。研究结果将对政策制定者具有重大价值，他们担心董事会的相互关联可能会导致糟糕的投资决策，或者相反，这种将企业联系在一起的社会关系可以提高生产率。因此，从这项研究中获得的信息将有助于提高美国的经济效率和竞争力。***

9320930 Mizruchi This is a study of the extent to which large American corporations engage in business transactions with the firms represented on their boards of directors. Drawing on the resource dependence perspective, political sociology, and agency theory, the study develops a model to predict the conditions under which corporations do business with firms to which they have directorate interlocks. Taking advantage of a 1978 Securities and Exchange Commission ruling that mandated that firms disclose business relations with the firms of their board members, the model will be tested with data on the 500 largest U.S. manufacturing corporations from 1981 (the first year for which reliable business transaction data exist) through 1992. Because the design is longitudinal, the study will permit the examination of a series of questions that involve reciprocal causation, including: (1) the effect of the presence of a lending banker in a firm's board on the firm's access to subsequent financing; (2) the extent to which such financing comes from the board member's institution; (3) the extent to which lending banks are appointed to a firm's board after a loan is made; and (4) whether ties with lending banks are more likely than ties with non-lending banks to be replaced when accidentally broken. %%% This study will contribute to economic sociology, political sociology, and to the development and testing of general sociological theories. Its findings will be of significant value for policy-makers concerned that directorate interlocks may lead to poor investment decisions, or conversely that such social relationships linking corporations can enhance productivity. Thus, the information gained from this research will help improve American economic efficiency and competitiveness. ***