Doctoral Dissertation Research: Changing the Rules of the Game: Distributive, Informational and Partisan Approaches toCongressional Reform

9409451夏皮罗研究立法机构的新体制方法发展了一系列正式模式，解释了国会规则和程序的目的。然而，这一正式的工作很少与国会改革的实证研究相结合。本论文的研究项目将把现有的分配、信息和党派立法结构模型扩展到解释国会的变革，特别是委员会的结构和组成及其管辖权。由于这些模型对机构的耐久性提供了不同的解释，从这些新理论中得出的命题应该会预测关于国会委员会制度重组的不同经验结果。学生将使用众议院关于国会改革的经验证据来检验这些理论的解释力，以便比较每一种理论在解释自1910年大炮起义以来委员会制度和司法管辖区边界变化方面的有效性。对这些模式的审查结果将说明何时以及为什么发生了不同类型的司法改革和委员会改组。研究结果还将提供关于哪种立法结构方法最准确地捕捉国会不断演变的机构中成员的动机和行为的见解。

9409451 Shapiro Neoinstitutional approaches to the study of legislatures have developed a range of formal models that explain the purpose of congressional rules and procedures. However, this formal work has rarely been integrated with the empirical research on congressional reform. This dissertation research project will extend existing distributive, informational and partisan models of legislative structure into explanations of congressional transformations, especially the structure and composition of committees and their jurisdictions. Since the models provide divergent explanations for the endurance of institutions, propositions derived from these new theories should predict different empirical outcomes with respect to the restructuring of the congressional committee system. The student will examine the explanatory power of these theories, using empirical evidence on congressional reform in the House of Representatives in order to compare the effectiveness of each in explaining alterations in the committee system and jurisdictional boundaries since the Cannon Revolt of 1910. Findings from the examination of these models will give indications as to when and why different types of jurisdictional reform and committee restructuring have occurred. The results will also offer insights into which approach to legislative structure most accurately captures the motivations and behavior of members within the constantly evolving institution of congress.