Collusion in Exchange Networks: An Experimental Study

这是一个关于交换网络中共谋的研究。 一系列实验室实验，使用各种交换和通信网络，将测试关于社交网络中最有可能相互发展联盟的位置的假设，以及最有利于联盟形成的网络形状。 这项研究源于理查德·爱默生的理论工作，他提出交换网络中的功率趋于均衡。 那些最初权力较小的国家有增加其权力的战略，其中之一是形成抗衡联盟的可能性。 初始权力较小的个人可以通过形成一个单一的谈判单位来增加他们的权力。 以前的实验设计通过阻止非讨价还价的受试者相互交流来排除这种可能性。 本研究提出了一个预测交换网络中哪些位置会形成联盟的模型，并通过一系列实验对该模型进行了检验。 该模型在两个方面优于爱默生的模型。 首先，它意味着，联盟可能形成之间的弱势地位，不共享一个共同的贸易伙伴，它预测，联盟可能形成之间的位置，是相当遥远的网络连接的类别。 艾默生的模型仅限于有共同贸易伙伴的弱势地位。 其次，它描述了一个新的激励形成联盟：减少不稳定网络的不确定性。 与弱者联盟不同，这些联盟是交换伙伴之间的联盟。 %%% 该项目是关于联盟可能影响各种形式的社交网络中个人权力的方式的基础研究，因此它解决了社会资本理论中的关键问题。 这项工作与新兴的潜在阶级理论有关，这些理论可以在实验室中进行测试，然后扩展到帮助解释实际社区中的不平等程度。 社交网络的结构可能会成为决定个人在社会交换中获得的回报的一个主要因素，这与他们的技能或其他先前公认的人力资本属性的影响无关。

This is a study of collusion in exchange networks. A series of laboratory experiments, using a variety of networks of exchange and communication, will test hypotheses about the positions in social networks most likely to develop coalitions with each other, and the shapes of networks most conducive to coalition formation. This research springs from the theoretical work of Richard Emerson, who proposed that power in exchange networks tends to equalize. Those initially with less power have strategies available to increase their power, among which is the possibility of forming countervailing coalitions. Individuals with less initial power can increase their power by forming a single bargaining unit. The designs of previous experiments have precluded this possibility by preventing non-bargaining subjects from communicating with each other. The present research project suggests a model predicting which positions will form coalitions in exchange networks, and a series of experiments will test the model. The model is an advance over Emerson's in two respects. First, it implies that coalitions may form between weak positions that do not share a common trading partner, and it predicts that coalitions may form between classes of positions that are quite remotely connected in the network. Emerson's model was limited to weak positions that shared a common trading partner. Second, it describes a new incentive for forming coalitions: the reduction of uncertainty in unstable networks. Unlike coalitions of the weak, these are coalitions between exchange partners. %%% This project is fundamental research on the ways that coalitions may affect the power of individuals in social networks of various shapes, and thus it addresses crucial questions in theories of social capital. The work is connected to emerging new theories of latent classes that can be tested in the laboratory and then extended to help explain degrees of inequality in actual communities. The structure of social networks may turn out to be a major factor shaping the rewards individuals receive in social exchanges, quite apart from the effect of their skills or other previously recognized attributes of human capital.