Empirical Studies of Bidding and Entry

这是一个产业组织的实证研究项目。它由三个组成部分组成。第一个和第三个是与不列颠哥伦比亚大学的肯·亨德里克斯联合进行的。我们分析了从1954年到1990年，我们为墨西哥湾的联邦海上石油和天然气租赁销售收集的数据集。我们还开发和分析了一个关于加拿大小企业进入和发展的新数据集。第二部分是与National Economic Research Associates的道格·佐纳(Doug Zona)合作；我们分析采购拍卖中的串通投标行为。第一部分包括对联邦近海野猫区域联合竞标的研究。提交的投标中，超过一半是联合投标，1975年，美国国会禁止八家大型石油公司中的两家或两家以上参与联合投标。我们的研究目标是确定联合竞标所起的作用，以及禁令是应该更广泛还是更广泛。联合竞标可能会通过汇集资本或信息或分散风险来促进进入和竞争，但它们可能会产生反竞争的影响，因为它们允许公司同意不那么激进地竞标。这项研究提供了模型和结果，旨在区分这些可选的解释，以便为政策决策提供信息。这一组成部分对研究和开发的公共政策具有潜在的参考价值，因为联合投标类似于研究合资企业。第二个部件是与Doug Zona联合。我们已经获得了俄亥俄州一年一度的学校牛奶采购拍卖的广泛的小组数据集。目前正在进行一项反垄断调查，指控一些潜在竞购者之间存在串通。我们研究的目的是确定这些指控是否具有任何经验上的有效性，如果是的话，就学区支付的过高费用而言，其后果是什么。拟议的工作描述了串通投标的发生率和特点。我们研究合并和工厂关闭对投标提交模式的影响，以及提交投标的水平。所采用的经验方法不同于用于不同拍卖的方法，因为操纵投标的办法取决于拍卖规则和所售货物的性质，而且可以获得关于合同和投标人的更详细的数据。一般的研究问题是，是否可以从公开可用的数据中检测到操纵投标的计划。第三个组件也是与肯·亨德里克斯联合。我们与拉菲·阿米特领导的加州大学伯克利分校的一个研究团队一起，在加拿大统计局建立了一个纵向数据库，将1983至1993年间所有小企业初创企业的就业和纳税记录合并在一起。该数据集使我们能够更详细地分析小企业进入、增长和退出的决定因素；这项研究补充和扩展了最近对美国数据集的分析。

This is a project of empirical research in industrial organization. It consists of three components. The first and third are joint with Ken Hendricks of the University of British Columbia. We analyze a data set that we have assembled for the federal offshore oil and gas lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico from 1954 through 1990. We also develop and analyze a new data set on small business entry and evolution in Canada. The second component is joint with Doug Zona of National Economic Research Associates; we analyze bid rigging in procurement auctions. The first component consists of a study of joint bidding for federal offshore wildcat tracts. More than half of the bids submitted are joint, and in 1975 Congress banned joint bids involving two or more of eight large oil companies. The goal of our research is to determine the role played by joint bids, and whether the ban should have been more or less extensive. Joint bids may foster entry and competition, by pooling capital or information or by spreading risk, but they may have anti-competitive effects by allowing firms to agree to bid less aggressively. This research presents models and results designed to discriminate between these alternative explanations, in order to inform policy decisions. This component is potentially informative for public policy towards research and development, because joint bids are similar to research joint ventures. The second component is joint with Doug Zona. We have obtained an extensive panel data set on annual school milk procurement auctions in Ohio. There is an ongoing antitrust investigation alleging collusion among some of the potential bidders. The purpose of our research is to determine whether these allegations have any empirical validity, and, if so, what the consequences were in terms of excess prices paid by the school districts. The proposed work describes the incidence and characteristics of bid rigging. We study the effect of mergers and plant closings on the patterns of bid submissions, as well as the level of submitted bids. The empirical techniques employed differ from those used for different auctions, as bid rigging schemes depend on the auction rules and the nature of the goods being sold, and because more detailed data on the contracts and on the bidders are available. The general research issue is whether bid rigging schemes can be detected from publicly available data. The third component is also joint with Ken Hendricks. Together with a research team at U.B.C. headed by Raffi Amit, we assemble a longitudinal data base at Statistics Canada that merges employment and tax records for all small business start-ups between 1983 and 1993. The data set allows us to analyze the determinants of small business entry, growth and exit in some detail; this research complements and extends recent analysis of U.S. data sets.