Reputation and Perspective in Bargaining

项目摘要双方(例如，工会和企业、买方和卖方或两个政府)之间的讨价还价是最常见的经济事件之一，但经济学家远未对其如何运作有明确的理解。这个项目在研究讨价还价的方式上涉及两项创新。第一种是一种比过去分析的更灵活的讨价还价模式：它允许讨价还价者进行微妙的“建立声誉”行为，试图说服她的对手，她不太可能在不久的将来做出让步。从技术上讲，引入的“内生扰动”导致了一种貌似合理的实质性预测：讨价还价通常涉及长时间的不活跃，随后是显著的让步，通常会得到一定程度的互惠妥协。第二个创新认识到，达成协议的一个困难是，讨价还价的人对于什么是自然或公平的协议，可能真的会有不同的观点。虽然第一方明白这一点，但她无法知道第二方的实际观点是什么。不幸的是，这给了第二方一种动机，让他们(通过言语和行动)传达出这样一种印象，即有一个相对严肃的或自私的视角。讨价还价者在达成协议时遭受的损失有时会导致他们坚持执行协议，即使协议不再非常合适(外部环境已经改变)，因为他们担心摇摇欲坠的后果。这可能构成动力学模型中惯性理论的基础。“粘性价格”对于宏观经济学的核心问题具有重要意义；寡头垄断市场中的价格惯性是将要研究的“讨价还价视角”模型的主要应用。

Project Abstract Bargaining between two parties (a union and a firm, a buyer and a seller, or two governments, for example) is one of the most common economic occurrences, but economists are far from having a definitive understanding of how it works. This project involves two innovations in the way bargaining can be studied. The first is a model of bargaining that is more flexible than those analyzed in the past: it allows for a bargainer to engage in subtle `reputation-building` behavior, trying to convince her opponent that she is unlikely to make a concession in the near future. Technically, the `endogenous perturbations` that are introduced result in substantial predictions that have a plausible flavor: Bargaining typically involves long periods of inactivity, followed by concessions of noticeable size that are often greeted by a degree of reciprocal compromise. The second innovation recognizes that one difficulty in reaching agreement is that bargainers may genuinely differ in their perspectives on what a natural or fair agreement would be. While the first party understands this, she has no way of knowing what the second party's actual perspective is. This unfortunately gives the second party an incentive to convey the impression (through words and actions) of having a relatively severe, or self-serving, perspective. The losses sustained by the bargainers in reaching an agreement sometimes lead them to cling to an agreement even when it is no longer very suitable (external circumstances having changed), for fear of the consequences of rocking the boat. This could form the basis of a theory of inertia in dynamic models. `Sticky prices` are of major importance for the central questions of macroeconomics; price inertia in oligopolistic markets is a leading application of the `perspective in bargaining` model to be studied.