Doctoral Dissetation Research: The Effects of Ordering in Exchange Networks

这项拟议的研究调查了一系列关系的顺序如何影响每种关系中权力的行使。例如，当B在与C交换之前必须与A交换时，A-B-C网络被排序。我们预测A从该排序中受益；A获得比如果B不被限制首先与A交换将获得更好的交换率。看门人是控制对有价值的关系的访问并从这种控制中获益的行为者。例如，国际奥委会(IOC)是唯一有权确定奥运会举办地的机构。只有奥运会被吸引，才会有与之相关的有利可图的业务。国际奥委会一直在把关，最近有报道称，其成员从中获利。虽然有序效应可能发生在许多类型的关系中，但交易所网络为他们的研究提供了一个得到充分证实的背景。开发了一系列订单的模型。利用阻力方程，对模型进行了预测，并提出了9个实验。这些实验旨在证明有序对交换比率的影响，并确定有序如何与其他结构性权力条件相互作用。

The proposed research investigates how ordering a series of relations affects the exercise of power in each relation. For example, the A - B - C network is ordered when B must exchange with A prior to exchanging with C. We predict that A benefits from that ordering; A gains a better exchange ratio than would have been gained if B was not constrained to exchange first with A. A familiar example of ordering is gatekeeping. A gatekeeper is an actor who controls access to valued relations and benefits from that control. For example, the International Olympics Committee (the IOC) is the sole body with the authority to locate Olympic games. Only if Olympic games are attracted will there be the lucrative businesses associated with them. IOC gatekeeps and there are recent reports that its members profit. Though ordering effects can occur across many kinds of relations, exchange networks provide a well proven context for their investigation. Models for an array of orderings are developed. Using resistance equations, predictions for the models are generated and nine experiments are proposed. These experiments are intended to demonstrate the effect of ordering on exchange ratios and to determine how ordering interacts with other structural power conditions.