Topics in Auctions and Contractual Arrangements in Procurement

这个项目的目标是双重的。首先，将开发一种更现实的计算、识别和评估投标模型的框架，可用于研究美国公共部门采购系统的运作。将使用一种框架，允许投标人以拍卖开始前所理解的方式不同。投标人异质性是许多实际应用中的一个关键的经验问题。例如，在公共工程建设中，公司往往因地点、所从事的工作类型、目前的积压和管理效率而有所不同。因此，在招标开始之前，公司将在所有代理商都了解的某些项目上拥有成本优势或劣势。不对称的第二个重要来源是串通。卡特尔的成本分布将与竞争边缘不同，这一事实可能有助于从经验上识别串通竞标和竞争性竞标。这个项目的扩展将包括内生化企业的参与决策，因为内生化的参与显然是建模现实主义所需要的。此外，由于串通的一种形式是选择不与另一个卡特尔成员竞标，因此需要参与建模来理解竞争性竞标模式和串通竞标模式之间的差异。另一个扩展是利用这一结果，即只有当企业具有竞争性以经验地区分竞争和共谋时，投标的经验分布才可以在基础模型参数中交换。最后，建立了采购中的动态竞价模型。这是一个重要的经验性考虑，因为在许多应用中，企业将受到产能的限制。还将制定采购中常用的替代合同安排的成本和收益模式。在关于建筑施工中成本加成和固定价格合同的成本和收益的工程和施工管理文献中，合同形式的灵活性以适应变化的条件是一个中心问题。该模型的核心是在提供降低成本的激励措施和节省两种交易成本之间进行权衡。第一个成本是提供描述该项目的全面设计。第二个成本是由于对原始设计进行了昂贵的重新谈判。该模型能够复制建筑业私营部门的一些基本风格化事实。当总完工时间要最小化时，最好选择成本加合同，而合同开始前的规划往往不太完整。如果最大限度地减少项目总成本是关键，那么提供更详细的计划，固定价格承包是有利的。此外，更复杂的项目更多地由成本加成合同来管理。

The goals of this project are twofold. First, a more realistic framework for computa-tion, identification and estimation of bidding models that can be applied to studying the workings of the public sector procurement system in the United States will be developed. A framework that allows for bidders to be heterogeneous in ways that are understood before the auction begins will be used. Bidder heterogeneity is a key empirical problem in many real world applications. For example, in the construction of public works, firms often differ by location, the type of work that they specialize in, their current backlog and their managerial efficiency. As a result, firms will have cost advantages or disadvantages on certain projects that are understood by all agents before bidding begins. A second important source of asymmetries is collusion. A cartel will have a different distribution of costs than a competitive fringe and this fact may help to empirically identify between collusive and competitive bidding. Extensions of this project will include endogenizing the participation decision of firms since endogenizing participation is clearly needed for modeling realism. Also, since one form of collusion is to choose not to bid against another cartel member, modeling participation is needed to understand the difference between competitive and collusive bidding patterns. Another extension is to use the result that the empirical distribution of bids is exchangeable in the underlying model parameters only if the firms are competitive to empirically to distinguish between competition and collusion. Finally, a model of dynamic bidding in procurement will be built. This is an important empirical consideration, since in many applications, firms will be capacity constrained. A model of the costs and benefits of alternative contractual arrangements that are commonly used in procurement will also be developed. In the engineering and construction management literature on the costs and benefits of cost-plus and fixed price contracting in building construction, the flexibility of the contractual form to adjust to changed conditions is a central concern. The centerpiece of the model is a trade-off between providing cost-reducing incentives, and saving on transaction costs of two kinds. The first cost is that of providing a comprehensive design that describes the project. The second cost is due to costly renegotiation of the original design. The model is able to replicate some basic stylized facts from the private sector of the construction industry. When total completion time is to be minimized cost plus contracting is preferred and planning before contracting begins tends to be less complete. If minimizing total project costs is of the essence, then more detailed plans are provided and fixed price contracting is favored. Also, more complex projects are more often governed by cost-plus contracts.