Collaborative Research: Anonymous Protocols

这项工作的目的是支持协议的理解和发展，可以在互联网上提供个人隐私。虽然已经提出并实现了一些隐藏网络通信者IP地址的协议，但还没有对这些协议进行系统的研究，也没有开发出分析这些协议的匿名性和安全性的方法。深入了解匿名性不仅对开发、分析和使用个人隐私匿名协议很重要，而且对了解网络攻击者如何隐藏其位置以及开发跟踪这些攻击者的方法也很重要。我们的最终目标是开发新的匿名技术和协议，包括类似于认证协议的匿名逻辑，可以用来描述和分析匿名协议。我们的第一个contribution将采取一个更普遍的看法匿名通信比以前的工作，考虑协议和技术，隐藏身份的响应者从所有其他各方，并提供完全匿名通信中，发起人和响应者是匿名的对方和所有其他各方。前一种技术对匿名网站（而不仅仅是匿名网页浏览）有用;后一种技术对互联网上真正的双方隐私有用。我们的第二类贡献将考虑广义协议的建设。这扩展了我们过去的工作，解耦了匿名通信的前向和反向路径，产生了一个大的匿名协议家族。我们将继续调查这些协议，并研究什么样的网络支持可用于匿名通信，以及什么样的支持可能是最好的，在未来提供。我们的第三个贡献将是提供一个形式主义的匿名协议suchthat信念有关的实体身份可以通过陈述假设和推导逻辑的结论，从以下步骤定义的协议。第四，我们将深入研究匿名路由协议的网络性能，不仅包括延迟和流量，还包括流媒体应用和传统的基于TCP的批量数据传输应用的需求。最后，我们将考虑迄今为止被忽视的现有协议的安全问题，最初考虑路径分析攻击和攻击，导致一些参与者被第三方不公平地指责。我们所提出的匿名逻辑所提供的形式将是我们安全分析工作的基础组成部分。我们两个机构之间的合作将使我们能够利用马萨诸塞州大学现有的网络优势和普渡大学现有的匿名优势。

The purpose of this work is to support the understanding and development of protocolsthat can provide personal privacy over the Internet. While there have been some protocolsproposed and implemented that hide the IP address of network communicators, there has beenno systematic study of such protocols, nor have methods of analyzing the anonymity and securityof those protocols been developed. A thorough understanding of anonymity is important not onlyfor the development, analysis, and use of anonymous protocols for personal privacy, but also forunderstanding how network attackers can hide their location and for developing methods to trackthose attackers. Our eventual goal is to develop new techniques and protocols for anonymity,including a \logic of anonymity" similar to those developed for authentication protocols thatcan be used to describe and analyze anonymous protocols.This proposal considers a number of contributions on this research area. Our first contri-bution will be to take a more general view of anonymous communication than previous workby considering protocols and techniques for hiding the identity of a responder from all otherparties, and for providing completely anonymous communication in which both the initiator andresponder are anonymous to each other and all other parties. The former technique is usefulfor anonymous web sites (rather than just anonymous web browsing); the later technique isuseful for true two-party privacy over the Internet. Our second class of contributions will be toconsider generalized protocol construction. This extends our past work, which de-coupled theforward and reverse paths of anonymous communication, giving rise to a large family of anony-mous protocols. We will continue investigation of those protocols, and examine what networksupport is available for anonymous communication and what support might best be provided inthe future. Our third contribution will be to provide a formalism for anonymous protocols suchthat beliefs regarding entity identities can be reasoned by stating assumptions and deriving log-ical conclusions from following steps of defined protocols. Fourth, we will consider the networkperformance of anonymous routing protocols in an in-depth fashion, including not only latencyand traffic, but also requirements of streaming media applications and traditional TCP-basedbulk-data transfer applications. Finally, we will consider heretofore ignored security concernsof existing protocols, initially considering path analysis attacks and attacks that cause someparticipants to be unfairly accused by third parties. The formalism provided by our proposedlogic of anonymity will be a foundational component of our security analysis work.Collaboration between these our two institutions will allow us to leverage the existingstrength in networking at the University of Massachusetts and the existing strength in secu-rity at Purdue.1