Contractual issues in the financing of new firms: macroeconomic and policy implications

本提案中描述的研究旨在理解用于资助新公司及其增长的合同安排与总体经济波动之间的联系。吸引外部资金的能力对于创建新公司和扩大现有公司至关重要。因此，贷款人和企业之间的金融安排的性质对企业的成长有着重要的影响。它还可能对总体冲击的传播和总体经济的波动性产生重要影响。这个研究项目有三个目标。首先，研究契约问题如何影响新企业的最优融资及其后续成长。其次，它评估了这些契约问题的福利成本，因为它们导致了资源的低效配置，并研究了缓解这些福利后果的政策或制度类型。第三，研究契约问题在宏观经济中如何影响新投资机会的传播。为了实现这些目标，该项目整合了两种主要方法来研究金融摩擦对企业投资行为的影响。第一种方法侧重于阻碍市场完备性的摩擦的主要来源，以及这种不完备性对单个企业行为的影响。然而，它没有考虑到与宏观经济相关的问题。第二种方法关注的是市场不完备的总体影响。鉴于其总体关注，在这种方法中，市场不完全性是外因强加的，而不是内因产生的。由于这些模型的性质主要取决于假设的金融摩擦类型，因此希望这些摩擦在模型中是内生产生的，而不是由假设强加的。这对于设计旨在改善有限可收缩性所造成的低效率的政策和体制安排尤其重要。该项目整合了现有的金融市场不完全性研究方法，通过开发一个具有坚实微观基础的一般均衡模型来研究不完全性。企业家有能力长期经营一个创业项目，但需要外部资金来资助投资。通过最优长期合同与出借人建立长期关系，解决了融资问题。市场不完全性源于企业家拒绝金融合同的能力（即源于合同的有限可执行性）。通过整合现有的市场不完备性研究方法，该模型能够解决理论和政策相关问题。一般均衡结构有助于评估市场不完备的福利成本，而微观基础则允许分析能够支持资源的更优分配的政策或体制安排类型。

The research described in this proposal is directed to understanding the link between the contractual arrangements used to finance new firms and their growth and the volatility of the aggregate economy. The ability to attract external financing is crucial for the creation of new firms and the expansion of existing ones. For that reason the nature of the financial arrangements between lenders and firms has important consequences for the growth of firms. It also can have important consequences for the propagation of aggregate shocks and the volatility of the aggregate economy. This research project has three objectives. First, it studies how contractual problems affect the optimal financing of new firms and their subsequent growth. Second, it evaluates the welfare costs of these contractual problems that result because they induce an inefficient allocation of resources and studies the type of policies or institutions that alleviate these welfare consequences. Third, it studies how contractual problems affect the propagation of new investment opportunities in the macro-economy.To pursue these objectives, the project integrates the two main approaches to studying the impact of financial frictions on the investment behavior of firms. The first approach focuses on the primary sources of frictions that prevent market completeness, and the implications of this incompleteness for the behavior of individual firms. It fails to consider, however, issues of macroeconomic relevance. The second approach is concerned with the aggregate implications of market incompleteness. Given its aggregate focus, in this approach market incomplete-ness is exogenously imposed, rather than derived endogenously. Because the properties of these models depend critically on the type of financial frictions assumed, it is desirable that these frictions are endogenously generated in the model rather than imposed by assumption. This is especially important for the design of policies and institutional arrangements aimed at improving the inefficiencies generated by limited contractability.The project integrates the existing approaches to the study of financial market incompleteness, by developing a general equilibrium model with a solid micro-foundation for the incompleteness. Entrepreneurs have the ability to run an entrepreneurial project over a long time but need external funds to finance investment. Entering into a long-term relationship with a lender through an optimal long-term contract solves the financing problem. Market incompleteness derives from the ability of the entrepreneur to repudiate the financial contract (i.e. from the limited enforceability of contracts). By integrating the existing approaches to the study of market incompleteness, the model is able to address theoretical and policy-related questions. The general equilibrium structure facilitates the evaluation of the welfare costs of market incompleteness, while the micro-foundations permit the analysis of the type of policies or institutional arrangements that can support a superior allocation of resources.