Information Economics, Confidential Settlement Bargaining and Judicial Decision-Making

本研究将使用博弈论和信息经济学的方法来研究法律制度的两个重要方面及其对市场和司法效率的影响。一个主题是保密解决方案对商品和服务市场表现的影响。本研究将解决这一解决方案的市场影响，以及替代的私人和公共政策，以解决已经成为一个重大问题：允许保密解决保护和鼓励各种市场中代理人的不良行为。或者，禁止保密也可能损害重要的价值观，例如个人隐私和通过商业保密保护知识产权；如果没有达成保密和解的能力，一些重要的案件可能永远不会被提起，提起的案件中可能达成和解的更少。重要的是要确定这些权衡及其对市场表现的影响，以便（法官和立法者）能够采取明智的公共政策。第二个主题涉及诉讼当事人和法官之间的信息差异如何影响个别案件的结果，并最终影响法律的演变。司法程序本质上是被动的：必须提起诉讼并提出上诉，以便法院能够澄清规则并制定/解释法律。当法律由一系列法院制定或解释时（在我们的制度中就是这样），纠正措施（如上诉）的有效性可能会因资源不足或组织笨拙等问题而减弱。这项研究将涉及一些重要的政策问题。在保密结算的情况下，允许保密结算是否会对定价和安全产生不利影响？对于公司可能造成的这种低效率，私人部门是否会做出回应（例如，公司是否能够可靠地、有利可图地承诺避免保密协议？），或者新的公共政策是否必要（例如禁止保密）？现行法律，如替代责任原则（其中，例如，公司对雇员的工作相关行为造成的损害负责），是否改善或加剧了使用保密协议来掩盖经济主体的不良行为？在法院决策建模的背景下，信息是如何在等级法院系统中聚集的？是什么竞争力量决定了哪些案件会得到高等法院的审查（本质上，“调卷市场”是如何运作的？）？司法效率低下在多大程度上是系统性和持续性的，或者制度化的矫正（如司法异议）在什么时候才能促进司法效率？这项关于法院收集信息的研究有助于了解法院如何运作、法律如何演变、可能导致司法效率低下的因素以及哪些行动或政策可以补救这些问题。

This research will use methods from game theory and information economics to examine two important aspects of the legal system and their implications for market and judicial efficiency. One topic is the impact of confidential settlements on performance in markets for goods and services. This research will address the market implications of this settlement option as well as alternative private and public policies to address what has come to be a significant concern: that allowing confidential settlement protects and encourages bad behavior by agents in a variety of markets. Alternatively, banning confidentiality may also compromise important values, such as personal privacy and the protection of intellectual property via trade secrecy; without the ability to conclude confidential settlements, some important cases may never be brought, and fewer of those brought are likely to settle. It is important to identify these tradeoffs and their implications for market performance in order that sensible public policy can be pursued (by judges and legislators). The second topic concerns how differences in information among litigants and judges affect the outcomes of individual cases and, ultimately, the evolution of the law. The judicial process is inherently passive: suits must be filed and appeals made in order for courts to be able to clarify rules and make/interpret law. When law is made, or interpreted, by a sequence of courts (as is true in our system), the effectiveness of correctives (such as appeal) may be attenuated by problems of insufficient resources or unwieldy organization.The study will address a number of important policy issues. In the context of confidential settlements, does allowing confidential settlements adversely affect pricing and safety? Are there private responses to such inefficiencies that firms can make (e.g., can firms credibly, and profitably, commit to eschew confidential settlements?), or is new public policy necessary (such as banning confidentiality)? Does current law, such as the doctrine of vicarious liability (wherein, for example, corporations are liable for harms caused by employees' job-related actions), ameliorate or exacerbate the use of confidential settlements to hide the bad behavior of economic agents? In the context of modeling decision-making by courts, how does information get aggregated in hierarchical court systems? What competitive forces determine which cases receive higher-court review (essentially, how does the "market for certiorari" operate?)? To what degree will judicial inefficiency be systematic and persistent, or when will institutionalized correctives (such as judicial dissent) work to promote judicial efficiency? This research on information aggregation by courts contributes to understanding how courts function, how the law evolves, what may contribute to judicial inefficiency and what actions or policies may remedy such problems.