Conference: Experiments and Theory in Economics
Conference: Experiments and Theory in Economics
批准号:
2315108
负责人:
Guillaume Frechette
金额:
$4.96万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2024
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2024-01-01 至 2024-12-31
中文摘要
该奖项将资助一系列会议,其目的是将来自经济理论和实验经济学各自领域的专家聚集在一起。在过去的四十年里,经济理论和实验一直保持着卓有成效的关系。在此期间,经济实验揭示了许多“行为异常”,也就是说,在实验室中一直观察到的行为,似乎不符合当时流行的经济模型。这些看似反常的观察结果最终导致了许多经济模型的改进。通过这一系列的会议,研究人员寻求继续和扩大这种重要的合作(在经济理论家和实验家之间),为这些各自研究小组的学者创造许多机会进行现场交流,其中将包括来自两个领域的最新报告。这种持续的合作对于确保寻求解释经济主体行为的理论和模型的更新至关重要。来自心理学、政治学和计算机科学的专家的参与为这些会议提供了一个跨学科的维度。具体来说,该系列的第一次会议的主题是“使用不正确的模型进行学习”。行为经济学积累了大量证据,证明了许多经济环境中的系统性错误和偏见。确定代理如何随着时间的推移(通过经验和新信息的连续获取)纠正这些错误的问题至关重要。研究人员已经从经济理论方面确定了关于这一主题的新兴文献;但在这个重要的问题上,几乎没有实验和行为上的仔细研究。因此,组织这一活动可能会促进有关这一主题的实验文献的发展。与会者包括来自美国各大学的世界知名专家和学生。在第二次会议上,组织者计划探讨“信息设计与说服”的主题,其本质是指一个人通过选择所提供的信息来影响另一个代理人所选择的行动的能力。在过去的十年中,许多理论著作在不同的背景下使用了说服模型:选民动员、交通路线、评级系统、金融市场的透明度等。然而,迄今为止,实验经济学的相关工作都集中在相当简单和不切实际的例子上。因此,第二次会议将使这两个领域的研究人员有机会消除这两个领域之间的脱节。该系列还包括关注其他主题的其他活动。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命,并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估,被认为值得支持。
英文摘要
This award will fund a series of conferences whose objective is to bring together experts from the respective fields of economic theory and experimental economics. Economic theory and experiments have had a fruitful relationship for the last four decades. Over the course of this period, economic experiments have allowed to uncover many “behavioral anomalies”, that is to say, behaviors which were consistently observed in the lab and did not seem to conform to the prevalent economic models at the time. These seemingly anomalous observations have eventually resulted in the refinement of numerous economic models. Through this series of conferences, the investigators seek to continue and amplify this important collaboration (between economic theorists and experimentalists) by creating many opportunities for scholars in these respective groups of researchers to have live exchanges, which will include state-of-the art presentations from the two fields. This continued collaboration is crucial to ensure the updating of the theories and models seeking to explain the behavior of economic agents. The participation of experts from psychology, political science, and computer science gives an interdisciplinary dimension to these conferences.Specifically, the first conference in the series focuses on the topic of “learning with incorrect models”. Behavioral economics has accumulated ample evidence documenting systematic mistakes and biases in many economic environments. The question of determining how agents correct these mistakes over time (with experience and sequential acquisition of new information) is of central importance. The investigators have identified a burgeoning literature on this topic from the economic theory side; but there is almost no experimental and behavioral scrutiny on this important question. The organization of this event is thus likely to spur the development of the experimental literature on this topic. The list of conference participants includes world-renowned experts and students from various universities across the United States. In the second conference, the organizers plan to explore the topic of “information design and persuasion”, which essentially refers to one’s ability to influence, through the choice of the information provided, the actions chosen by another agent. In the last decade, many theoretical works have used models of persuasion in various contexts: voter mobilization, traffic routing, rating systems, transparency in financial markets, etc. However, to date, the related works from experimental economics have focused on rather simplistic and unrealistic examples. The second conference will thus give researchers in both field the opportunity to eliminate this disconnect between the two fields. The series includes additional events, which focus on other topics.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
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会议论文
Collaborative Research: Causal Structures: Experiments and Machine Learning
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批准号:2315665
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$23.45万
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财政年份:2023
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负责人:Guillaume Frechette
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依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Regret in Games: When It Is Not (Only) Your Fault
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批准号:2146695
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$1.45万
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财政年份:2022
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负责人:Guillaume Frechette
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依托单位:
Frictions in a Competitive, Regulated Market
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批准号:1558857
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$34.4万
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财政年份:2016
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负责人:Guillaume Frechette
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依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research: Understanding Trust through Higher-Order Beliefs
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批准号:1260891
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$0.86万
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财政年份:2013
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负责人:Guillaume Frechette
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依托单位:
Infinitely Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: An Experimental Analysis
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批准号:1225779
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$30.12万
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财政年份:2012
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负责人:Guillaume Frechette
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依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research: An Experimental Investigation of Employment Protection and Labor Substitutability
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批准号:1058380
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$0.6万
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财政年份:2011
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负责人:Guillaume Frechette
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依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research: An Experimental Investigation of Malapportionment in Legislatures
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批准号:0925897
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$0.97万
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财政年份:2010
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负责人:Guillaume Frechette
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依托单位:
Experimental Investigations of Infinitely Repeated Games
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批准号:0924780
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$33.62万
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财政年份:2009
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负责人:Guillaume Frechette
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依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Self Confidence in a Principal Agent Relationship
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批准号:0849465
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$1.15万
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财政年份:2009
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负责人:Guillaume Frechette
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依托单位:
Collaborative Research: Theory, Experiments and Empirical Methodology of Coalition Bargaining: An integrated Approach
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批准号:0519045
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$15.82万
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财政年份:2005
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负责人:Guillaume Frechette
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依托单位:
海外基金