Secure Peer-to-Peer Overlay Networks

题目：安全点对点覆盖网络spi: Baruch Awerbuch和Christian Scheideler， Johns Hopkins大学摘要点对点（P2P）系统最近由于各种原因变得非常流行。例如，点对点系统不需要中央服务器的事实意味着个人可以合作，而无需付费或投资额外的高性能硬件。此外，点对点系统允许使用在单个计算机上闲置的计算和存储资源。此外，点对点系统的分散和分布式特性使它们对意外故障具有鲁棒性。不幸的是，许多当前和提议的P2P系统的架构都假定节点是可信的，不会有恶意行为。虽然这可能在中央认证机构的帮助下实现，但在许多情况下，限制P2P系统的成员资格是不可取的。因此，系统必须能够承受各种安全攻击。许多现有的系统在面对非常轻微的攻击（我们称之为不走运输入攻击）时都非常脆弱。不需要做任何恶意的事情来执行主要的拒绝服务。即使所有处理器都严格遵守协议，系统也有可能遇到连接性极差（从而影响性能）或某些站点内存溢出的情况。此外，如果用户在不合适的时间离开网络，他们可能会永久地删除数据或断开某些站点的连接。尽管这些不幸事件可能很少发生，但攻击者可以显著减少此类事件所需的时间，而无需做任何非法的事情，例如更改协议或嗅探其他对等体之间的通信。这些异常利用了现有方法中的“小理论故障”，但它们可以作为主要DOS攻击的平台。这项工作的目标是为点对点系统建立一个健全的理论基础，以解决现有系统中的这些问题。

CCR-0311795Title: Secure Peer-to-Peer Overlay NetworksPIs: Baruch Awerbuch and Christian Scheideler, Johns Hopkins UniversityABSTRACTPeer-to-peer (P2P) systems have recently become extremely popular for a variety of reasons. For example, the fact that peer-to-peer systems do not need a central server means that individuals can cooperate without fees or an investment in additional high-performance hardware. Also, peer-to-peer systems enable the use of computations and storage resources that otherwise sit idle on individual computers. Furthermore, the decentralized and distributed nature of peer-to-peer systems makes them robust against accidental faults.Unfortunately, the architecture of many current and proposed P2P systems assumes that the nodes can be trusted not to behave maliciously. While this may be possible to achieve with the help of a central certification authority, in many situations it is not desirable to constrain the membership of a P2P system. Consequently, the system must be able to withstand a variety of security attacks. Many of the existing systems are quite vulnerable security against very mild attacks that we call unlucky-input attacks. There is no need to do anything malicious to execute a major denial of service. Even if all processors follow the protocol to the letter, it is possible for the system to run into a situation with extremely poor connectivity (and therefore performance) or a memory overflow at some sites. Furthermore, if users leave the network at inopportune times, they may permanently remove data or disconnect some sites. Although these bad luck events may rarely happen, an adversary can significantly reduce the time required for such events without doing anything illegal such as altering the protocol or sniffing at communication between other peers. These anomalies exploit "minor theoretical glitches" in the existing approaches, and but they could serve as a platform for major DOS attacks.The goal of this work is to develop a sound theoretical foundation for peer-to-peer systems that will allow fixing these problems in existing systems.