Doctoral Dissertation Research: The Struggle for Accountability in Mexico: Explaining Uneven Political Development

近年来，许多腐败控制机构、自主选举机构和中央银行、独立审计机构、人权监察员和“检察官”如雨后春笋般涌现，试图在使用国家权力时提供纪律和回应。与发达国家的一些对应机构一样，这些新成立的支持问责制的独立机构中，许多机构的特点往往是机构业绩不佳。如何解释负责监管和检查滥用国家权力的不同政府机构面临的问题的程度和类型的差异？本文试图通过比较和对比墨西哥三个独立机构的历史、结构和职能来探讨这些问题：联邦选举研究所(IFE)、国家人权委员会(CNDH)和联邦高级审计师(ASF)。这个项目提出了两个假设。首先，“破坏”假说认为，墨西哥威权联盟对一家机构的创建和改革拥有越大的权力，它的设计缺陷就越多，这些缺陷将对其机构绩效产生负面影响。其次，“扎根的专业精神”假说认为，独立机构的表现更好的是，它们实行任人唯贤的招聘(无论是对高级别还是低级别官员)，受到社会有权势的部门的信任和积极支持，以及在政府内部拥有强大的机构地位。为了验证这些假设，调查员将在墨西哥花12个月的时间进行面谈和查阅档案材料。这项研究的更广泛影响将通过其分布、促进美国和墨西哥研究人员之间的合作的潜力以及对社会科学培训和基础设施的贡献来实现。这项研究的结论将通过四种方式传播：(1)它将被纳入由国际和平协会和共同国际组织在加州大学圣克鲁斯分校教授的关于拉丁美洲和墨西哥政治变化的课程的讲座和阅读作业中；(2)它将被纳入共同国际组织关于发展中国家支持问责制的国家改革的咨询工作中；(3)它将在专业会议和大会上发表；(4)它将被用来撰写提交给政治社会学领域的主要期刊和出版商的文章。这项研究还将通过促进跨境学术网络来加强研究和教育的基础设施，因为联合PI将在他的实地工作期间被安置在墨西哥最重要的研究机构之一(经济研究与教学中心(CIDE))，这将使他能够在加州大学系统和墨西哥研究机构之间建立重要的联系。

In recent years, numerous corruption control agencies, autonomous electoral institutes and central banks, independent auditing agencies, human rights Ombudsmen, and "public prosecutors" have sprung up throughout the developing world in an attempt to provide discipline and responsiveness in the use of state power. Like some of their counterparts in the developed world, many of these new independent pro-accountability agencies often are characterized by poor institutional performance. What explains the level and variation in the types of problems faced by different government agencies tasked with regulating and inspecting abuses of state power? This dissertation looks to explore these questions by comparing and contrasting the history, structure and functioning of three independent agencies in Mexico: the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) and the Superior Federal Auditor (ASF). This project poses two hypotheses. First, the "sabotage" hypothesis argues that the more power the Mexican authoritarian coalition has over an agency's founding and reform, the more design flaws it has that will negatively affect its institutional performance. Second, the "grounded professionalism" hypothesis argues that independent agencies perform better when they have meritocratic recruitment (for both high and low-level officials), are trusted and actively supported by powerful sectors of society, and have a strong institutional location within government. In order to test these hypotheses the investigator will spend twelve months in Mexico conducting interviews and consulting archival materials. The broader impact of this research will be achieved through its distribution, its potential to promote collaboration between US and Mexican researchers, and its contribution to social science training and infrastructure. The study's findings will be disseminated in four ways: (1) It will be incorporated into the lectures and reading assignments for the classes on political change in Latin America and Mexico that both the PI and the CO-PI teach at UC Santa Cruz; (2) It will be incorporated into the consulting work that the Co-PI conducts on pro-accountability state reform in the developing world; (3) It will be presented at professional meetings and conferences; (4) It will be used to write articles that will be submitted to leading journals and publishers in the field of Political Sociology. This research will also enhance the infrastructure for research and education by facilitating cross-border scholarly networks since the co-PI will be housed at one the most important research institutes in Mexico (the Center for Economics Research and Teaching (CIDE)) during his fieldwork which will allow him to establish important links between the UC system and the Mexican research establishment.