Schematicity and compasitionality in experiential theories of language comprehension

语言理解的经验理论认为，理解是建立在情态表征的基础上的，而情态表征的基础是知觉和行为。大量的研究表明，语言理解与情态表征之间存在着密切的关系。然而，这些表述的确切性质尚不清楚。此外，几乎没有证据表明模态表征确实是实现对语言表达的充分理解所必需的。拟议中的研究是对正在进行的奖学金资助的研究的延伸，通过六个实验来调查这些问题。基于一个新发展的范畴学习范式，三个实验比较了图式理论和范例观点作为语言理解经验理论表征模型的有效性。三个进一步的实验使用双任务范式来测试颜色表征的激活是否是理解包含颜色诊断对象的句子的必要组成部分。

Experiential theories of language comprehension claim that comprehension is based on modal representations, which are grounded in perception and action. A large body of research has demonstrated that there is a close relationship between language comprehension and modal representations. However, the exact nature of these representations is not clear. Also, there is little evidence for the claim that modal representations are indeed essential to achieve an adequate understanding of linguistic expressions. The proposed research, which extends research funded by an ongoing fellowship, investigates these questions with six experiments. Based on a newly developed category-learning paradigm, three experiments compare the validity of schema-theoretic and exemplar views as representational models for experiential theories of language comprehension. Three further experiments use a dual-task paradigm to test whether the activation of color representations is an essential component of the comprehension of sentences involving colordiagnostic objects.