DOCTORAL DISSERTATION RESEARCH: SACRIFICING SOVEREIGNTY: EXPLAINING STATE CONSENT TO BINDING ARBITRATION WITH FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTORS

本项目研究双边投资条约中投资者与国家间仲裁条款的现象。该项目解决了两个重要的和未充分研究的问题。为什么越来越多的国家选择放弃国际法规定的基本主权权利之一：外国直接投资者在国际法庭上的诉讼豁免权？放弃这一权利真的有助于吸引外国投资吗？ 拟议的项目将对双边投资条约/仲裁现象进行第一次系统的、有理论依据的经验分析。 特别是，该项目将开发一个独特的数据集，系统地评估每个双边投资条约的争端解决和其他实质性条款的相对强度。 争端解决措施将在一系列检验项目核心预测的统计模型中交替作为因变量和关键解释变量：民主程度较低的资本输入国往往在缔结双边投资条约时有强有力的有利于投资者的争端解决条款，投资者保护条款最强的双边投资条约将对外国直接投资产生更大的积极影响比规定较弱的双边投资条约的流入量更大。

This project examines the phenomenon of investor-state arbitration provisions in bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The project addresses two important and understudied questions. Why are states increasingly choosing to relinquish one of their fundamental sovereign rights under international law: immunity from suit by foreign direct investors before international tribunals? And does relinquishing that right actually help to attract foreign investment? The proposed project will provide one of the first systematic and theoretically informed empirical analyses of the BIT/arbitration phenomenon. In particular, the project will develop a unique dataset that systematically evaluates the relative strength of each BIT's dispute settlement and other substantive provisions. The dispute settlement measure will serve alternately as the dependent and key explanatory variable in a series of statistical models testing the project's core predictions: that weakly democratic capital importing states will tend to conclude BITs with strong pro-investor dispute settlement provisions, and that BITs with the strongest investor protection provisions will have stronger positive impacts on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows than will BITs with weaker provisions.