Collaborative Research: Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic Models with Behavioral Perturbations

经济学家已经开发了各种各样的模型来预测随着时间的推移，经济主体将如何战略性地相互作用。然而，这些模型中的许多都缺乏预测能力，因为多重均衡是通过博弈论中使用的标准均衡定义来预测的。最近的研究表明，在一些特殊的游戏类别中，在游戏中加入更丰富的可能行为集，可以形成决定单一结果的声誉。这个项目将把这些想法应用到一大类重要的游戏中，那些模拟讨价还价行为的游戏。该项目将特别强调了解当讨价还价者没有完全了解对手的一些目标或收益时会发生什么。其目标是在这一经济理论的核心领域开发更强有力的预测。更广泛的影响包括对经济模型进行更强有力的实证测试的能力。一旦经过测试，这些模型将允许经济学家向政策制定者和其他利用讨价还价在国家、利益集团、公司和个人之间达成协议的人提供更好的建议。

Economists have developed a wide variety of models to predict how economic agents will interact strategically over time. However, many of these models suffer from a lack of predictive power because multiple equilibria are predicted by the standard equilibrium definitions used in game theory. Recent research shows that in some special classes of games, adding a richer set of possible behavior to the game allows reputations to form that dictate a single outcome. This project will apply these ideas to a large and important class of games, those that model bargaining behavior. The project will place particular emphasis on understanding what happens when bargainers are not fully informed about some of the opponent's goals or payoffs. The goal is to develop stronger and more robust predictions in this central area of economic theory.Broader implications include the ability to conduct much stronger empirical tests of economic models. Once tested, the models will allow economists to give much better advice to policy-makers and others who use bargaining to reach agreements between nations, interest groups, firms, and individuals.