Doctoral Dissertation Resarch: The Role of Demand Information and Monitoring on Collusion: An Experimental Assessment

由于卡特尔在美国的非法地位，很少有关于共谋的实地数据，这使得对共谋主题的实证分析变得困难。更重要的是，由于现场数据中有许多外生和不可观察的因素，识别和估计不同市场条件对共谋的影响的任务变得困难。这篇博士论文旨在通过分析受控实验产生的数据，提高对需求信息和监测对卡特尔行为的作用的理解，这些实验旨在模拟各种需求和监测条件。这个项目将使用弗吉尼亚理工大学的人类思想和行为研究实验室来进行实验。更具体地说，这一提议包括一系列实验，旨在测试市场的不同方面如何影响公司达成和维持共谋结果的能力。该项目检验了需求信息和监控对串通的作用。其动机是这两个市场因素在卡特尔稳定性理论文献中的重要性。除了允许对这些因素在共谋中的作用进行评估外，这些处理方法还包含了两个非常有影响力的卡特尔稳定性理论的假设：格林和波特（1984）和罗滕贝格和塞洛纳（1986）。因此，这种设计允许测试每个理论的内部有效性。这是一个重要的特征，因为有了实地数据，并不能保证观察到的企业行为似乎与给定理论的预测相对应，就是理论在起作用的结果。在共谋的情况下，内部有效性的含义可能是至关重要的；如果共谋理论在受控环境中通过了简单的测试，那么与该理论预测相一致的行业行为可能会被当局视为共谋的更有力证据。最后，该项目扩展了实验设计，以分析不同程度的需求波动如何影响我们的处理结果。该项目将产生以下更广泛的影响：(1)使包括司法部和联邦贸易委员会在内的政策制定者更好地了解需求信息和不完善的监控如何影响企业串通并获得更高利润的能力。(2)提供证据，证明在何种市场条件下，价格战是共谋失败的标志，或者是卡特尔经营的一种强制机制。这可能有助于当局处理反垄断案件。(3)提高对需求波动对企业能力串谋作用的认识。(4)作为发展新理论的起点，这些理论可以更好地捕捉卡特尔行为中无法解释的方面。

Due to the illegal status of cartels in the US, field data on collusion is seldom available, making it difficult to analyze collusion themes empirically. More importantly, with many exogenous and unobservable factors in field data, the task of identifying and estimating the effect of different market conditions on collusion becomes problematic. This doctoral dissertation is aimed at improving the understanding of the role of demand information and monitoring on cartel behavior through the analysis of data generated by controlled experiments that are designed to resemble various demand and monitoring conditions. This project will use the Laboratory for the Study of Human Thought and Action at Virginia Tech to conduct the experiments. More specifically, this proposal consists of a series of experiments aimed at testing how different aspects of the market affect firms' ability to reach and sustain collusive outcomes. The project tests the role of demand information and monitoring on collusion. It is motivated by the importance these two market factors have had in the theoretical literature of cartel stability. Besides allowing for an assessment of the role of these factors on collusion, these treatments encompass the assumptions of two highly influential theories of cartel stability: Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). Thus, this design permits tests of each theory's internal validity. This is an important feature since with field data there is no guarantee that observed firm behavior that appears to correspond to the predictions of a given theory is a result of the theory at work. In the case of collusion, the implications of internal validity can be of paramount importance; if a collusion theory passes simple tests in a controlled environment, then industry behavior that is in accordance with the predictions of the theory may be considered by authorities as stronger evidence for collusion. Finally, the project extends the experimental design to analyze how different degrees of demand volatility affect the results of our treatments.The project will have the following broader impacts: (1) Provide policy makers, including the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, with a better understanding of how demand information and imperfect monitoring affect firms' ability to collude and attain higher profits. (2)Provide evidence of the market conditions under which price wars are a sign of collusion failure or an enforcement mechanism of an operating cartel. This may assist authorities in antitrust cases. (3) Improve knowledge on the role of demand volatility on firms' ability collude. (4) Serve as a starting point for the development of new theories that can better capture unexplained aspects of cartel behavior.