Doctoral Dissertation Research: Turnover and Accountability of Appointed and Elected Judges

这个项目解决了政治经济学中的一个核心问题，即如何挑选公职人员。它重点介绍了两个机构，这两个机构用于为美国各州的州法院挑选和保留法官。在一种制度下，当法官席位空缺时，州长会选出一名新法官，任期届满的在任法官必须在每届任期结束时面对选民的赞成或反对投票，没有挑战者。在另一种制度下，法官是通过竞争选举产生的，涉及政党之间的竞争，现任法官在候选人之间竞争的情况下竞选同类连任。本研究以两种制度下法官的离职率为研究对象。统计数字显示，民选法官的改选失败率远高于委任法官。核心问题是：(I)在任命和上下投票的情况下，失败率较低是否意味着问责性和连任担忧对法官行为的影响较弱，以及(Ii)影响法官连任概率及其行为的主要政治经济因素是什么。这些问题是通过使用法官刑事量刑和选举结果的个人数据来构建和估计法官行为的动态模型来解决的。通过这一分析，本项目回答了(I)两种制度下的连任程序在经验上有何不同，即连任结果对法官行为、法官特征以及选区的政治和社会特征的敏感性，以及(Ii)在两种制度下选出的法官的特征有何不同。通过这一分析，该项目为解释流失率和两种制度在问责方面的差异提供了准确的答案。智力价值：这项研究首次尝试结合法官个人在法庭上的行为来解释司法选举的选举结果模式，这是利用个人层面的数据实现的创新特征。此外，这是第一次尝试结合重新运行的决策来估计公职人员的政策决策的动态模型，这是对现有文献的重大贡献。更深远的意义：如何挑选公职人员一直是美国许多公职人员(如公用事业专员和学校董事会)的一个有争议的问题。关于司法甄选机制的运作也存在着长期的争论(例如，美国律师协会)，而长期的争论在没有明确了解的情况下导致规则的频繁变化。通过本项目的具体理解，有助于完善公职人员选拔的制度设计和制度稳定性。这项研究还为理解更复杂的现象提供了很好的基础，例如在许多州，选举活动在司法选举中的作用越来越大。

This project addresses a central question in political economics, which is how to select public officials. It focuses on two institutions that are used to select and retain judges for the state courts in the U.S. states. Under one institution, the governor selects a new judge when there is an open seat in the bench, and the incumbent judge whose term expires has to face an up-or-down vote by the voters at the end of each term, without challengers. Under the other institution, judges are selected through contested elections which involve competition between political parties, and the incumbent judges run for re-election of the same kind with competition among candidates. This research focuses on the turnover rate of the judges under the two systems. Statistics show that the failure rate in the re-election is substantially higher for the elected judges than for appointed judges. The central questions are (i) whether the lower failure rate under the appointment and up-or-down vote implies weaker accountability and weaker effect of reelection concern on the behavior of judges, and (ii) what are the main politico-economic factors that affect the judges' reelection probability along with their behavior. These issues are addressed by constructing and estimating a dynamic model of judges' behavior using individual- level data of judges' criminal sentencing and electoral outcomes. Through this analysis, this project answers (i) how the re-election processes differ under the two systems empirically, in the sense of the sensitivity of the reelection outcome to judges' behavior, judge's characteristics, and political and social characteristics of the constituency, and (ii) how the characteristics of the judges selected under the two systems differ. Through this analysis, the project provides precise answers for the interpretation of the turnover rate and the difference of the two systems in terms of accountability.Intellectual Merit: This research is the first attempt to explain the patterns of electoral outcomes of judicial elections in conjunction with the individual judges' behavior in the court, which is an innovative feature enabled by using individual-level data. Moreover, it is the first attempt to estimate a dynamic model of public officials' policy decisions in conjunction with re-running decisions, and represents a significant contribution to the existing literature.Broader Significance: How to select public officials has been a controversial issue for many public offices in the U.S. such as public utility commissioners and school boards. There has also been a long debate (e.g., by American Bar Association) regarding functioning of judicial selection mechanisms, and long-lasting debate without clear understanding caused frequent change of the rules. Concrete understanding from this project helps to improve the institutional design for selection of public officials and the institutional stability. The research also provides a good ground for understanding more complex phenomena such as the increasing role of electoral campaign in judicial elections in many states.