Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: In It to Win It? Domestic Politics and Signaling Long Term Resolve in International Crises

长期以来，学者们一直强调解决国际危机的重要性。 然而，迄今为止的文献主要侧重于使用武力的意图。 该项目试图将关于决心的争论焦点从愿意兑现威胁转移到愿意承担长期冲突的代价。 这对危机谈判过程产生了新的见解，并对冲突可能升级到更高的暴力水平以及冲突升级后的预期结果产生了影响。国内政治是一个有用的指标，表明国家何时可能愿意承担持续战斗的代价。 在民主国家，主要政治反对派的行为对一个国家愿意在战争中承受的成本有很大影响。 反对党往往会在危机的早期阶段支持政府，即使他们完全打算在以后撤回他们的支持。 如果他们真的反对冲突，政府将面临因失败而受到惩罚的更大风险。 对未来反对派的担忧可能会迫使政府在冲突初期接受解决方案，同时仍得到反对派的支持，而不是冒着继续战斗的风险，希望获得更好的解决条件。 因此，如果反对派目前支持冲突，但这种支持是脆弱的，政府更有可能结束战争。 另一方面，一旦反对派反对冲突，政府实际上更有可能继续战斗，因为他们的政治命运现在与冲突的结果更加紧密地联系在一起，他们被迫承担更大的风险以避免失败。为了评估这些主张，将编制一个数据集，记录主要反对党在涉及已建立民主国家的国家间战争中的战时立场。 还将收集这些战争中随着时间的推移而死亡的数据。 使用事件历史分析，反对派的行为和事实对战争的持续时间和结果的影响将被估计。 该项目将产生有用的数据，可供其他研究人员用于回答其他重要问题，例如哪些因素决定是否反对战争，反对对公众舆论和选举结果的影响，以及哪些因素决定相对伤亡率的变化。 这里的分析结果将是重要的，因为它们可以帮助我们更好地解释为什么民主领导人经常选择继续打不受欢迎的战争（就像美国在越南和目前在伊拉克所做的那样），以及为什么民主领导人经常提前结束受欢迎和成功的战争，当他们可以进一步压迫敌人时（就像美国在波斯湾战争中所做的那样）。 这将有助于我们理解战争的政治，并阐明为什么领导人坚持失败的政策。

Scholars have long emphasized the importance of resolve in international crises. However, the literature to date has largely focused on the intent to use force. This project seeks to shift the focus of arguments about resolve from the willingness to make good on one's threats to the willingness to bear the costs of a prolonged conflict. This produces new insights into the process of crisis bargaining, with implications for which conflicts are likely to escalate to higher levels of violence as well as the expected outcome of the conflict should it escalate.Domestic politics serves as a useful indicator of when states are likely to be willing to bear the costs of sustained fighting. In democratic states, the behavior of the primary political opposition has a large impact on the costs a state is willing to suffer in war. Opposition parties will often support the government in the early stages of a crisis, even if they have every intention of withdrawing their support later. If they do oppose the conflict, the government faces a far greater risk of punishment for failure. A fear of future opposition could force governments to accept settlements early in conflicts, while they are still supported by the opposition, rather than risking continued fighting in hopes of better terms of settlement. Therefore, governments are more likely to end their wars if the opposition is currently supporting the conflict but that support is tenuous. On the other hand, once the opposition does oppose a conflict, governments actually become more likely to keep fighting, as their political fates are now more closely tied to the outcome of the conflict and they are forced to take bigger risks to avoid failure. To assess these claims, a dataset will be compiled on the wartime position of the primary opposition party(ies) for interstate wars involving established democracies. Data will also be collected on battle fatalities over time within these wars. Using event history analysis, the effects of opposition behavior and facts on the ground on the duration and outcome of war will be estimated. This project will produce useful data that can be used by other researchers to answer other important questions, such as what factors determine whether a war will be opposed, the effect of opposition on public opinion and electoral outcomes, and what factors determine changes in the relative rates of casualties. The results of the analysis here will be important, as they may help us better explain why democratic leaders often choose to continue fighting unpopular wars (as did the US in Vietnam and currently in Iraq) and why democratic leaders often end popular and successful wars early, when they could have pressed the enemy further (as did the US in the Persian Gulf War). This will help us understand the politics of war, and shed light on why leaders cling to failing policies in general.