Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: A Third Term? An Analysis of the Degree to Which Formal Democratic Institutions Constrain Leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa

在过去十年中，非洲民主国家出现了一种趋势，即许多总统试图修改国家宪法，以废除行政任期限制。 一些总统成功地取消了任期限制;一些总统失败了;还有一些总统在两届任期后自愿下台，而没有尝试修改宪法。 是什么原因导致一些领导人试图争取第三个任期，而另一些人则满足于在宪法规定的两个任期结束后放弃权力？ 更进一步，在领导人决定推动任期限制修正案的情况下，是什么原因导致了这些投标的成功或失败？ 该项目的目的是回答这些问题，并通过研究非洲各地任期限制法律的可塑性如何影响非洲大陆民主巩固的前景，进一步解释这些问题。 了解领导人在多大程度上受到正式民主制度的限制，无法实现个人偏好，以及总统如何利用先前的非正式制度，如赞助网络，在政治制度中获得优势，有助于回答正式民主制度如何以及在多大程度上对非洲产生影响这一重要问题。 该项目的第一阶段调查个别领导人如何决定在两届任期后下台或通过赞助宪法修正案争取第三届任期。 这是通过以选择为中心的分析来进行的，该分析建立了理论决策演算，然后通过采访前总统及其亲密助手（例如内阁成员和部委负责人）来测试和验证。 该项目的第二阶段旨在揭示为什么在决定寻求第三个任期后，一些总统成功地通过了修正案，而另一些总统则失败了。在这一阶段，回归分析和定性比较分析（QCA）被用来揭示在撒哈拉以南非洲的案例中的相关变量，其次是三个国家，乌干达，坦桑尼亚和赞比亚的国内案例研究，以确定的因果机制，任期限制延长投标结果的基础。 每个案例研究的数据将通过半结构化的个人访谈、焦点小组访谈、机构分析、档案研究和民意数据分析来收集。 这项研究的一个更广泛的影响是为政策制定者提供了了解总统何时以及如何克服法律规定的权力限制的手段，这在非洲以及其他地区至关重要，因为痛苦的历史。大人物？统治整个大陆。 乌干达的伊迪·阿明、扎伊尔（现为刚果民主共和国）的蒙博托·塞塞·塞科和利比里亚的查尔斯·泰勒等独裁者过去的残暴政权在许多非洲人的记忆中都是如此清晰。 揭示允许领导人炫耀其权力限制的条件（政治和社会）是促进民主在这些国家生存的条件的第一步。

Over the past ten years a trend has emerged among African democracies whereby many presidents have attempted to amend national constitutions for the purpose of abolishing executive term limits. Some presidents have been successful in their bids to lift term limits; some have failed; while still other presidents have willingly stepped down after their two terms in office without attempting such a constitutional change. What causes some leaders to try for a third term while others are content to relinquish power once their constitutionally mandated two terms are up? Going a step further, among cases where the leader has decided to push for a term limit amendment, what accounts for the success or failure of those bids? The aim of this project is to answer these questions and to take the explanations a step further by examining how the plasticity of term limit laws across Africa affects the prospects of democratic consolidation on the continent. Understanding the degree to which leaders are constrained from achieving their personal preferences by formal democratic institutions and how presidents can utilize prior informal institutions, such as patronage networks, to gain advantages within the political system can help answer the important question of how and the degree to which formal democratic institutions are influential in Africa. The first stage of this project investigates how individual leaders make the decision to either step down after two terms in office or try for a third term by sponsoring a constitutional amendment. This is carried out through a choice-centered analysis that builds a theoretical decision calculus that is then tested and verified through interviews with former presidents and their close associates, such as cabinet members and ministry heads. The second stage of the project seeks to uncover the reasons why, after a decision is made to seek a third term, some presidents succeed in getting an amendment passed while others fail. In this stage, both regression analysis and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) are used to uncover the relevant variables across cases in sub-Saharan Africa, followed by in-country case studies of three nations, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia, in order to identify the causal mechanisms that underlie term limit extension bid outcomes. Data for each case study will be gathered through semi-structured personal interviews, focus group interviews, institutional analysis, archival research, and public opinion data analysis. A broader impact of this study is providing policymakers with the means for understanding when and how presidents can overcome legally set limits to their power, which is crucial in Africa, as well as other regions, because of the painful history of ?big man? rule across the continent. The brutal past regimes of dictators such as Idi Amin in Uganda, Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), and Charles Taylor in Liberia are all too vivid in the memories of many Africans. Uncovering the conditions (both political and social) that allow leaders to flaunt limits to their power is a first step in fostering the conditions in which democracy can survive in these nations.