Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Corruption in India's Workfare System

在欠发达国家，腐败是再分配和减轻贫困的主要障碍。该项目研究了印度农村官员的选择，他们可以在一个就业保障项目中从多个来源（政府或受益人）窃取资金。程序参数的外生变化使适应和测试有关腐败行为的几个核心假设成为可能。贪官在追求利益最大化时面临哪些制约？一种形式的腐败是否会对其他形式产生正面或负面的溢出效应？回答这些问题将为腐败行为的经济理论提供微观经验基础。这种方法补充了最近关于腐败的实证文献，这些文献测量了干预措施对腐败水平的减少效应（Reinikka & &; Svensson 2005, Olken 2007）。该项目在印度的旗舰再分配计划《全国农村就业保障法》（NREGA）的背景下研究腐败问题。这一法案代表了将印度新发现的财富转移给落后的农村人口的前所未有的尝试：它为每个农村家庭提供了每年100天带薪就业的法律保障。潜在的财政影响是巨大的，预计成本将达到GDP的1-2%。该计划的成功，以及其持续的政治可行性，与腐败的控制程度有关。然而，来自当地非政府组织领导人和审计研究的轶事证据表明，至少在该国的某些地区，腐败现象十分猖獗。NREGA为研究腐败提供了一个独特的机会，因为作为其透明度措施的一部分，所有官方微记录都可以在网上获得。将这些官方记录与从（所谓的）项目参与者那里收集的原始调查数据进行比较，可以得出一个可信的腐败衡量标准，包括过度报告的参与和低薪支付。此外，最低工资等关键项目参数由各州设定，并随着时间的推移而变化。比较州边界两边这些变化前后的结果，可以对其影响做出可信的差异中差异估计。NREGA还提供了一个令人兴奋的背景，研究政治经济学中的问题，如选举的纪律权力、权力下放和妇女领导。在腐败的政治经济学中，最基本的问题之一是，直接选举的纪律是否能强制执行良好的行为，我们通过调查NREGA参与者的政治行为来研究这个问题。其次，政治分权和地方参与已成为流行的发展战略。根据新农村地区法，每个地区一半的项目必须由一名官员在街区（或更高）一级实施，另一半项目必须由一名民选官员在克村委会（村）一级实施。腐败的差异和对工资变化的不同反应将揭示这些实施形式的相对优点。最后，在国际比较和本地研究中，女性政治家与腐败呈负相关（Duflo和Topalova 2004）。在印度，一些克村务委员会被随机挑选出一名女性村长，这一政策对《国家土地登记法》项目腐败的影响可以很容易地进行评估。

Corruption is a major barrier to redistribution and poverty alleviation in less-developed countries. This project studies choices by bureaucrats in rural India who can steal from multiple sources-the government or beneficiaries-in a single employment guarantee program. Exogenous changes in program parameters make it possible to adapt and test several core hypotheses about corrupt behavior. What constraints do corrupt officials face in maximizing profit? Does corruption in one form have positive or negative spillover effects onto other forms? Answering these questions will provide micro-empirical foundations for economic theories of corrupt behavior. This approach complements the recent empirical literature on corruption which has measured reduced-form effects of interventions on the level of corruption (Reinikka & Svensson 2005, Olken 2007).The project studies corruption in the context of India's flagship redistributive scheme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). This act represents an unprecedented attempt to transfer India's new-found wealth to its lagging rural majority: it extends to every rural household a legal guarantee of 100 days per year of paid employment. The potential fiscal ramifications are massive, with costs expected to reach 1-2% of GDP. The success of the program, along with its continued political viability, is linked to the extent to which the corruption can be controlled. However, anecdotal evidence from local NGO leaders and audit studies suggests that corruption is rampant at least in some parts of the country.The NREGA affords a unique opportunity to study corruption because, as part of its transparency measures, all official micro-records are available online. Comparing these official records to original survey data collected from (alleged) program participants yields a credible measure of corruption, both in the form of over-reported participation and under-paid wages. Moreover, key program parameters such as minimum wages are set by states and have changed over time. Comparing outcomes before and after these changes on both sides of state borders generates credible difference-in-differences estimates of their effects.The NREGA also provides an exciting context in which to study issues in political economy such as the disciplinary power of elections, decentralization, and women's leadership. Among the most basic questions in the political economy of corruption is whether the discipline of direct elections can enforce good behavior, and we study this by surveying NREGA participants on their political behavior. Next, political decentralization and local participation has become a popular strategy for development. Under the NREGA, half of the projects in each district must be implemented at the block level (or higher) by a bureaucrat, and the other half at the gram panchayat (village) level by an elected official. Differences in corruption and differential responses to wage changes will shed light on the relative merits of these forms of implementation. Finally, female politicians are negatively associated with corruption in both international comparisons and local studies (Duflo and Topalova 2004). In India, some gram panchayats are randomly chosen to have a female sarpanch and the impacts of this policy on corruption in NREGA projects can be readily assessed.