RI: Medium: Collaborative Research: Methods for Empirical Mechanism Design

支持群体决策、为分布式任务分配资源或调解社会互动的计算系统的设计与服务于个人或集中式用户的相应设计问题有着根本的不同。 当涉及多方或代理人时，设计者的目标会因为这些各方的利益很少（如果有的话）完全一致而变得复杂。机制设计领域提供了一个理论框架，直接解决激励问题，因为它涉及到多智能体系统的设计。 然而，这种纯粹分析性的方法具有内在的实际局限性。研究者们提出了一种新的方法，经验机制设计（EMD），其前提是扩展机制设计的基本基础与经验方法，如模拟和统计分析。这些扩展承诺显着扩大机制设计的范围，超越小规模，程式化，或理想化的领域，它一直主要局限于dates.The项目将调查几个具体的EMD问题，在市场设计的一般主题。改进市场设计对公共和私营部门具有重大影响。 在公共政策方面，基于市场的办法可能在制定科普气候变化的措施、银行改革和监管以及采用新能源等方面发挥重要作用。 在商业领域，广告投放、计算服务和其他商品的新市场也将需要大量的机制设计工作。 无论哪个部门，设计成果都关系到重要的社会目标，包括效率、透明度和稳定性（例如，财务关系）。评估候选机制的经验基础将补充现有的理论观点，丰富设计者和其他利益攸关方可用的工具。

The design of computational systems that support group decisions, allocate resources to distributed tasks, or mediate social interactions is fundamentally different from the corresponding design problem serving individual or centralized users. When multiple parties, or agents, are involved, the designer's objectives are complicated by the fact that the interests of these parties are rarely, if ever, perfectly aligned. The field of mechanism design offers a theoretical framework that directly addresses the issue of incentives as it relates to the design of multiagent systems. However, this purely analytical approach carries with it inherent practical limitations. The investigators introduce a new approach, empirical mechanism design (EMD), whose premise is to extend the basic foundation of mechanism design with empirical methods such as simulation and statistical analysis. These extensions promise to dramatically expand the scope of mechanism design beyond the small-scale, stylized, or idealized domains to which it has been predominantly limited to date.The project will investigate several concrete EMD problems, within the general theme of market design. Improved market design has significant implications for the public and private sectors. In public policy, market-based approaches are likely to play a major role in, for example, instituting measures to cope with climate change, banking reform and regulation, and adoption of new energy sources. In the commercial domain, new markets for advertising placement, computational services, and other goods will also entail significant mechanism design efforts. Regardless of the sector, design outcomes bear on important social objectives including efficiency, transparency, and stability (e.g., of financial relationships). An empirical basis for evaluating candidate mechanisms will complement existing theoretical perspectives, enriching the tools available to designers and other stakeholders.