Analysis of Affiliation, Entry, and Bidding in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders

该奖项资助研究开发新的统计方法，用于分析个人在战略情况下的行为。主要的重点是发展新的计量经济学技术来分析竞标者在拍卖中的行为。首席研究员开发了一种方法，可用于测试新的理论，即在观察到进入行为、竞标者的私人价值和进入成本相关以及潜在竞标者不对称的情况下，新的竞标者为什么以及何时以初始出价进入拍卖。这个测试是直观的，使用了最近开发的模拟方法，也可能在各种其他应用中有用。该项目的第二个目标是开发一种结构计量经济模型，可用于有关联投标人和不对称投标人的情况。本研究采用的结构方法克服了以往方法的一些困难。PI通过使用它来分析木材拍卖的数据来说明新方法的优点。这项研究在两个方面产生了更广泛的影响。这里开发的方法也可以用于开发新的统计技术，用于分析其他类型的战略决策的数据。木材拍卖数据分析的具体结果将有助于决定自然资源使用程序的州和联邦决策者。

This award funds research to develop new statistical methods for analyzing data on how individuals behave in strategic situations. The major focus is to develop new econometric techniques for analyzing bidder behavior in auctions. The principal investigator develops a method that can be applied to test new theories about why and when new bidders enter an auction with an initial bid when entry behavior is observed, bidders' private values and entry costs are affiliated, and potential bidders are asymmetric. This test is intuitive and uses a recently developed simulation method that may also be useful in a variety of other applications.The second goal of this project is developing a structural econometric model that can be used for situations with affiliated and asymmetric bidders. The structural approach adopted in this research overcomes a number of difficulties with previous methods. The PI illustrates the advantages of the new method by using it to analyze data from timber auctions.This research has broader impact in two ways. The approach developed here can also be used to develop new statistical techniques for analyzing data on other kinds of strategic decision making. The specific results of the timber auction data analysis will help state and Federal policymakers who must decide the procedures for using natural resources.