Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: The Merits of Money and "Muscle": How Serious Criminality Impacts Democracy in India

在从意大利到印度尼西亚的民主环境中，我们看到自由和公正的选举与大量据称是犯罪的立法者并存。与此同时，在许多发展中民主国家，人们越来越担心，选举领域正日益局限于少数拥有巨额个人财富的政客。本研究考虑民主政治中金钱与“力量”的互动效应。这个项目的动机是一个简单的谜题：为什么民主国家的政客经常因为他们的犯罪关系而受到奖励，而不是惩罚？调查人员利用独特的数据来源，通过对世界上最大的民主国家印度的考察，研究被控有犯罪行为的候选人在民主社会中获得成功的条件。这项研究试图解决四个首要问题。首先，政党为什么要招募有严重刑事指控的候选人，金钱在其中起了什么作用？第二，涉嫌犯罪对选举表现有什么影响？第三，如何解释选民支持有犯罪嫌疑的候选人的动机？最后，金钱和“力量”对民主问责制的有效运作有什么影响？这项研究旨在帮助我们理解罪犯与选举之间的关系，这种关系适用于各种民主环境。首先，这项研究提供了一种衡量犯罪和政治腐败的独特方法，广泛适用于广泛的民主环境。其次，更好地理解金钱在候选人选择中的作用，为政治选择的文献增加了一个先前未被理论化的维度。第三，本研究旨在帮助我们理解犯罪政治家的原因和后果，即选民的动机未被充分发掘。识别和解释这些动机也可以帮助决策者制定政策，以改善印度和其他选举民主国家的法治和民主效率。

In democratic settings ranging from Italy to Indonesia, we observe the coexistence of free and fair elections with a large number of allegedly criminal legislators. At the same time, there is a growing concern in many developing democracies that the electoral sphere is increasingly being restricted to a narrow cadre of politicians who boast significant personal wealth. This study considers the interactive effects between money and "muscle" in democratic politics. The project is motivated by the simple puzzle: why are politicians in democracies often rewarded, rather than punished, for their criminal connections.Taking advantage of a unique source of data, the investigators study the conditions under which candidates accused of criminal misconduct succeed in democratic societies through an examination of India, the world's largest democracy. The study attempts to address four overarching questions. First, why do political parties recruit candidates for office who possess serious criminal indictments, and what role does money play? Second, what impact does alleged criminality have on electoral performance? Third, what explains the motivations of voters in supporting suspected criminal candidates? And finally, what are the consequences of money and "muscle" for the effective functioning of democratic accountability?The research aims to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between criminals and electoral that is applicable to a diverse range of democratic settings. First, this study provides a unique method of measuring criminality and political corruption that is broadly applicable to a wide range of democratic settings. Second, a better understanding of the role of money in candidate selection adds a previously under-theorized dimension to the literature on political selection. Third, this study aims to contribute to our understanding of the causes and consequences of criminal politicians, namely the underexplored motivations of voters. Indentifying and explaining these motivations can also help policymakers develop policies that could improve the rule of law and democratic effectiveness in India and other electoral democracies.