Estimating the Policy Preferences of United States Courts of Appeals Judges Across Circuits and American Political Institutions

联邦巡回法院在所有意图和目的上都是美国联邦诉讼的最终仲裁人。他们每年作出数千项决定，使最高法院对任何个案进行复审的可能性微乎其微。 他们裁决的案件数量之多，加上最高法院不可能复审，使巡回法院成为美国法律的政策制定的引擎。然而，学者们缺乏关于美国上诉法院和在这些法院任职的法官的政策偏好的复杂数据，使他们无法从经验上研究美国上诉法院的法律如何演变，巡回法院法官是否根据法律或他们的政策目标做出决定，是什么导致法官相互讨价还价并满足同事的要求，以及巡回法官是否害怕国会和总统的报复。为了估计巡回法院法官的偏好，调查人员采用了最新和最复杂的测量技术，并以便于在美国12个巡回法院，最高法院，国会和总统之间进行比较的方式进行。 这些分数使研究人员能够确定一个特定的巡回法院法官是多么自由或保守，并将该法官的潜在意识形态倾向与其他法官在他们的电路，法官在替代电路，并与国会议员和总统。

The federal circuit courts are, for all intents and purposes, the final arbiters of federal litigation in the United States. They render thousands of decisions yearly, making the likelihood of Supreme Court review for any individual case minimal. The sheer number of cases they decide, combined with the improbability of being reviewed by the Supreme Court, make circuit courts the engines of legal policy making in the United States. Yet, scholars lack sophisticated data on the United States Courts of Appeals and the policy preferences of the judges who serve on them, leaving them unable to examine empirically how law evolves on the United States Courts of Appeals, whether circuit court judges render decisions based on the law or their policy goals, what leads judges to bargain with one another and accommodate their colleagues' requests, and whether circuit judges fear retribution from Congress and the president.To estimate circuit court judges' preferences, the investigators employ the most current and sophisticated measurement techniques, and do so in a way that facilitates comparisons across the twelve U.S. circuits, the Supreme Court, Congress, and the president. These scores enable researchers to determine how liberal or conservative a particular circuit court judge is, and to compare that judge's underlying ideological propensity with other judges in their circuit, judges in alternative circuits, and with members of Congress and the president.