Doctoral Dissertation Research in DRMS: A Study of the Efficiency Mechanism of Pooling Systems and Social Capital in Fisheries

共同管理已被认为是成功管理包括沿海渔业在内的共同资源的重要因素。渔业共同管理，即渔民作为一个团体集体管理渔业，正在引起人们的广泛关注，例如新英格兰底栖鱼渔业的部门分配计划。渔业共同管理的关键特征之一是旨在实现某些管理目标的集团自我强加的规则和做法。这项研究的重点是这样一种做法，即共享系统，在这种系统中，收获者在群体成员之间分享收获和/或利润。在日本，案例研究表明，共享系统运行良好，但有一个问题：理论上，共享系统不能有效，因为激励免费乘坐其他成员的捕鱼努力。这项研究着眼于两种机制——社会资本和努力协调——如何克服搭便车问题。社会资本是指人际关系中的信任、互惠、合作等属性。努力协调包括渔场轮换和联合销售。本研究通过对至少20个日本渔业社区的调查和实验，实证地考察了这些机制之间的相互关系。本项目提供了一个管理工具，即汇集系统，如何适用于美国渔业和其他类似的共同汇集资源的监管机构和利益相关者的更深层次的理解。这一新知识有助于美国渔业实现资源保护和资源利用的经济效率，特别是在无法采用有效法规或个人捕捞份额制度的渔业。此外，结果可能表明这些管理工具如何适用于发展中国家以及先进的工业民主国家。最终，这些新知识将通过促进更好的经济和更健康的环境而造福社会。

Co-management has been recognized as important in successfully governing common pool resources, including coastal fisheries. Fishery co-management, where fishermen collectively manage the fishery as a group, is garnering much attention, for example the the New England groundfish fishery's sector allocation scheme. One of the key characteristics of fishery co-management is the self-imposed rules and practices by the group that aims to achieve certain management goals. This researach focuses on one such practice, a pooling system, in which harvesters share catch and/or profits among members of the group. In Japan case studies have shown that pooling systems work well, but there is one problem: theoretically, pooling system cannot be effective due to the incentive to free-ride on other members' fishing effort. This study looks at how two mechanisms -- social capital and effort coordination -- may overcome the free-riding problem. Social capital refers to attributes such as trust, reciprocity and cooperation in human relationships. Effort coordination includes fishing ground rotation and joint marketing. This research empirically examines the inter-relationships of these mechanisms through surveys and experiments in at least twenty Japanese fishing communities. This project provides a deeper understanding of how one management tool, namely pooling systems, may be applicable for regulators and stakeholders in US fisheries and other similar common pool resources. This new knowledge helps US fisheries to achieve both conservation of resources and economic efficiency of resource use especially in fisheries that are not able to employ effective regulations or an individual catch-share system. Furthermore, the results may show how these management tools can be applicable in developing countries as well as advanced industrial democracies. Eventually, this new knowledge will benefit society by contributing to both a better economy and a healthier environment.