Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Economic Voting Dynamics

一个备受推崇的经济投票理论研究了货币政策的选举效应，理性党派理论（RPT）认为，党派通胀冲击遵循中期周期，这意味着货币政策在中期选举中很重要，但在年度选举中不重要。然而，最近的经验证据表明，通货膨胀在选举中的相关性已经降低;相反，失业在选举中仍然很重要。然而，货币政策的两个组成部分之间不断变化的选举动态的性质尚不清楚。为了解决这个难题，本研究调查了最近的货币政策发展的选举影响，特别是积极的通货膨胀稳定-在经济投票研究的一个欠研究的领域。这项研究的学术价值在于它应用了宏观经济政策中的最新概念，以了解经济投票的趋势。因此，本研究开发并整合理论与统计模型，以修正RPT下的通货膨胀中期周期，并将RPT扩展到研究失业政策的党派效应。首先，通过整合通胀预期的理论和行为概念以及通胀持续性的统计概念，本研究假设通胀稳定缓和了选民对年内选举结果的不确定性，导致中期通胀政策中性。其次，尽管通胀政策已非政治化，但失业政策仍是自由裁量的，并受制于党派力量。使用一个二维决策模型的党派政策和选民对失业严重程度的看法，研究测试的假设，选民总是奖励长期政策，但奖励或惩罚短期政策的基础上，其性能。然而，选民的行为被进一步假设为受收入水平的制约。首先，对稳定通货膨胀的强调导致了1980年代以来的低通货膨胀。在经济稳定是非常可取的情况下，商业周期的这种"大缓和"证明了宏观经济管理的成功。然而，正如我们从2008年金融危机中所学到的那样，该政策也有其局限性。本研究认为，选举影响反映了货币政策的不平衡：虽然最近通货膨胀不再是选举问题，但失业仍然是一个需要不时解决的问题。在缺乏有效的货币政策来稳定失业波动的情况下，公众将继续转向执政党寻求答案。研究表明，通货膨胀稳定有助于提高产出/失业稳定性。因此，货币政策制定者面临的挑战是完善政策工具，以实现"通货膨胀-产出协同稳定"，就像20世纪80年代和90年代所做的那样。最近旨在减少失业的政策措施，如明智地使用量化宽松，既符合上述对RPT的改进，也符合在通货膨胀目标方面取得的进展。

A highly-regarded economic voting theory examining the electoral effects of monetary policy, the Rational Partisan Theory (RPT), posits that partisan inflation shocks follow the midterm cycle, implying that monetary policy matters in midterm elections but not during on-year elections. Yet, recent empirical evidence shows inflation has become less relevant electorally; instead, unemployment still matters in elections. The nature of the changing electoral dynamics between the two components of monetary policy is unclear, however. In order to solve the puzzle, this study investigates the electoral implications of recent monetary policy developments, in particular, the aggressive inflation stabilization - an understudied area in economic voting research. The intellectual merit of the study lies in its application of recent concepts in macroeconomic policy to understand trends in economic voting. Accordingly, the study develops and integrates theoretical and statistical models to rectify the midterm cycle of inflation under the RPT, and to extend the RPT to examine the partisan effects of unemployment policy. First, through the integration of theoretical and behavioral concept of inflation expectations and the statistical concept of inflation persistence, the study posits inflation stabilization moderates voters' uncertainty of on-year election outcomes, resulting in inflation policy neutrality at midterms. Second, while inflation policy is de-politicized, unemployment policy remains discretionary and is subject to partisan forces. Using a two-dimensional decision-making model of partisan policy and voter perceptions on unemployment severity, the study tests the assumption that voters always reward long-term policy but reward or punish short-term policy based on its performance. Voter behavior, however, is further assumed to be conditioned by income levels.The broader impacts of the study are twofold. First, the emphasis on inflation stabilization has resulted in low inflation since the 1980s. To the extent that economic stability is highly desirable, this "great moderation" of the business cycle is a testament to the success of macroeconomic management. Yet, the policy has its limitations, as we have learned from the 2008 financial crisis. The electoral implications, as this study argues, reflect a monetary policy imbalance: while inflation ceases to be an election issue in recent time, unemployment remains a problem to be solved from time to time. In the absence of an effective monetary policy to stabilize unemployment volatility, the public will continue to turn to the political party in power for answers. Research has shown that inflation stability can contribute to greater output/unemployment stability. The challenge to monetary policymaker, therefore, is on perfecting the policy tool to achieve "inflation-output costabilization", as it did during the 1980s and 1990s. Recent policy measures aiming at reducing unemployment, such as the judicious use of quantitative easing, are consistent with both the refinements to RPT posited above but also with advances made in inflation targeting.