EAGER: Exploring Trade-offs in Cyber Offense and Defense Through the Lenses of Computer and Political Science

这个项目考察了政府在从事网络攻击和防御之间所面临的权衡。各国政府可能会利用不太安全的互联网来获取情报和战略优势。但更安全的互联网鼓励更多的人在线参与，并减少公民接触网络犯罪的机会。因此，各国政府面临着一个艰难的两难境地：他们是否应该放弃可能有用的网络行动，而致力于加强互联网，以提供全球利益？为了回答这个问题，这个项目旨在构建一个进攻性和防御性网络行动的分类法，描述攻击选择的范围以及它们可能造成的附带损害。该项目的发现可能有利于美国的国家安全，因为它为政策制定者提供了一种评估进攻性网络行动相对于意外后果的价值的方法。具体地说，拟议的研究项目有三个相关组成部分：第一个组成部分是对攻击性和防御性网络行动的不同方法以及漏洞类别的总结和评估。第二种是考察两种政治学理论对网络安全政策辩论的适用性：霸权稳定论和攻防理论。为了在网络环境下对这些理论进行评估，研究人员对历史的互联网弹性进行了定性和定量的分析，对以前的网络操作进行了回顾核算，进行了结构化的受控比较分析，并对过去的操作进行了反事实分析。该项目的第三部分使用上述分析为政策制定者和情报组织制定指导方针，指导他们何时披露或储存漏洞，以及如何在几种可用策略中进行选择，以平衡进攻和防守。这个项目有可能改变我们对网络安全国际政治的理解。它通过用严格的计算机科学分析测试成熟的政治学理论来检验网络战的权衡。这种方法通过得出互联网弹性和网络空间攻防平衡的简约性衡量标准，为实现重要的理论突破创造了机会。

This project examines the trade-offs governments face between engaging in cyber offense and defense. Governments may exploit a somewhat less secure Internet to gain intelligence and strategic advantage. But a more secure Internet encourages more participation online and reduces citizens' exposure to cybercrime. Thus governments face a difficult dilemma: Should they forego potentially useful cyber operations and work on strengthening the Internet in order to provide a global good? To answer this question, this project aims to construct a taxonomy of offensive and defensive cyber operations, describing the range of attack options and the possible collateral damage they may cause. The project's findings may benefit U.S. national security by giving policymakers a way of assessing the value of offensive cyber operations against the unintended consequences.Specifically, the proposed research project has three related components: The first component is a summary and assessment of different approaches to offensive and defensive cyber operations and classes of vulnerabilities. The second is an examination of the suitability of two political science theories to the debate over cybersecurity policy: hegemonic stability theory and offense-defense theory. To evaluate these theories in the cyber context, the researchers conduct qualitative and quantitative analysis of historical Internet resiliency, retrospective accounting of prior cyber operations, structured controlled comparative analyses, and counterfactual analyses of past operations. The third part of the project uses the foregoing analysis to develop guidelines for policymakers and intelligence organizations about when to disclose or stockpile vulnerabilities, and how to choose among several different strategies available to balance offense and defense. This project has the potential to transform how we understand the international politics of cybersecurity. It examines cyber warfare trade-offs by testing established political science theories with rigorous computer science analysis. This approach creates an opportunity for reaching an important theoretical breakthrough by deriving parsimonious measures of internet resilience and the offense-defense balance in cyberspace.