RAPID: Presidentialism, Democratic Collapse and the Potential Rise of a One-Party State.

本研究旨在回答两个问题：(1)是什么影响政治精英支持或反对从议会制民主向总统制民主的转变，以及(2)是什么影响民主国家的政治精英支持或反对向非民主一党制国家的过渡。现有理论将精英对总统制的偏好解释为执政党精英的政治不安全感以及所有政治精英的思想和政策激进化的结果。现有的理论试图解释为什么民主国家崩溃分配执政党精英的信念，关于他们的政治权力的安全，结构性因素，如贫困和种族激进化，国际因素，如地区战争和外援在他们的理论的核心作用。过去25年的政治事件表明，政党在改变政权和破坏民主方面发挥了重要作用。在这个项目中，通过调查政治精英（渴望在土耳其议会中担任民选职位的候选人）来研究总统选择和民主崩溃的问题。采访这组议员候选人提供了一个独特的机会来评估议会成员的激励结构和决策过程，这些议员将决定土耳其从议会制向总统制的转变。这些关于信仰、偏好和计算的精英调查数据允许对议会制/总统制和民主崩溃的现有和新的理论进行测试，而这在以前是不可能的，因为缺乏精英层面的数据。在这个项目中，PI建议收集精英层面的调查数据，这将使她能够测试与两个重要问题相关的现有和新的理论：(1)是什么影响政治精英支持或反对从议会制民主向总统制民主的转变，以及(2)是什么影响民主国家的政治精英支持或反对向非民主一党制国家的过渡。现有关于政治制度和民主崩溃的文献研究表明，执政党精英对掌握政治权力的不安全感、精英的意识形态和政策激进化，以及贫困和种族极化等结构性因素，是影响精英选择总统制而不是议会制、支持向非民主政权过渡的关键决定因素。然而，最近的经验趋势是立法修改宪法以促进向总统制和非民主政权的过渡，这表明现有的解释在这些现象中没有充分说明政党的作用。最近的实证趋势也挑战了现有的理论，这些理论认为，纪律严明的政党会改善总统制政权逆转民主的动机。该项目通过对土耳其议会候选人进行调查，收集精英阶层的数据，测试现有的总统选择理论和民主崩溃理论，以及关于政党在这些现象中扮演的角色的新理论。执政的正义与发展党提议将土耳其的议会制改为总统制，这被视为正义与发展党建立一党专政的一种手段。通过这个精英调查项目，PI试图了解AKP-MP候选人和反对党MP候选人在议会/总统过渡问题上的激励结构。这一研究将有助于为国会和总统之间的选择以及总统任期延长的文献提供信息。

General SummaryThis study seeks to answer two questions: (1) what influences political elites to support and oppose a transformation from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential democracy and, (2) what influences political elites in a democracy to support or oppose a transition to a non-democratic one-party state. Existing theories explain elite preference for presidential systems as a result of political insecurity of ruling party elites and, ideological and policy radicalization among all political elites. Existing theories that seek to explain why democracies collapse assign the beliefs of ruling party elites regarding the security of their political power, structural factors such as poverty and ethnic radicalization and, international factors such as regional wars and foreign aid central roles in their theories. Political events in the last 25 years show that parties have been important in changing regimes and in undermining democracies. In this project, examines the questions of presidential choice and democratic collapse by surveying political elites--candidates aspiring to hold elected office in parliament in Turkey. Interviewing this set of MP candidates offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the incentive structures and decision-making process of parliamentary members who will decide the question of Turkey's transformation from a parliamentary to a presidential governance system. These elite-survey data on the beliefs, preferences and calculations allows for the testing of existing and new theories on parliamentarism/presidentialism and democratic collapse not possible previously because of lack of elite-level data. Technical SummaryIn this project, the PI proposes to collect elite-level survey data that will allow her to test existing and new theories related to two important questions: (1) what influences political elites to support and oppose a transformation from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential democracy and, (2) what influences political elites in a democracy to support or oppose a transition to a non-democratic one-party state. Extant research in the literatures on political institutions and democratic collapse identify the insecurity of ruling party elites regarding their grip on political powers, ideological and policy radicalization among elites and structural factors such as poverty and ethnic polarization as key determinants influencing elites to choose a presidential over parliamentary system and, to support a transition to a non-democratic regime. However, recent empirical trends towards legislating constitutional changes to facilitate transitions to presidentialism and to non-democratic regimes suggest that existing explanations under-theorize the role of political parties in these phenomena. Recent empirical trends also challenge existing theories that posit that disciplined parties ameliorate the incentives of presidential regimes to reverse democracy. This project tests existing theories of presidential choice and democratic collapse and new theories regarding the role political parties play in these phenomena by collecting otherwise unavailable elite-level data through a survey of parliamentary candidates in Turkey. The ruling AKP Party's proposal to change Turkey's parliamentary system to a presidential one is viewed as a means for the AKP to create a one-party autocracy. Through this elite-survey project the PI seeks to understand the incentive structure for both AKP-MP candidates and opposition party MP candidates in the parliamentary/presidential transition question. This research will help inform literature on the choice between parliamentary and presidential and also literature on the extension of presidential term of office.