Doctoral Dissertation Research: Enforcing Pollution Regulations in Authoritarian Regimes

这个研究项目解释了专制国家如何执行污染管制。此外，本研究探讨了国家和地方机构之间的相互作用，因为它们涉及到污染法规的执行。 本研究探讨两个主要机构如何为地方官僚创造不同的激励结构，并提出以下研究问题：1）贫穷官僚依赖污染企业的事实是否会使贫穷官僚比富裕官僚更有可能违抗中央权威，保护污染企业？2）企业的国有制是否使地方官员更容易从某些污染者那里获得遵守？通过强调国家机构对官僚行为的影响，这个项目提请注意为什么政府代理人系统地反抗或服从政府领导人的结构性解释。它还研究了威权领导人用来应对新出现的治理危机的工具和战略。本研究项目解释了专制国家如何执行污染管制。此外，本研究探讨了国家和地方机构之间的相互作用，因为它们涉及到污染法规的执行。本研究以中国为例，通过案例研究和统计分析，确定中国283个地级市的官员在惩罚或保护污染者时的选择。定量部分使用两个原始数据集来测试与中国污染监管执法不力相关的关键变量：首先，使用NASA卫星数据，PI编制了一个关于283个城市污染违法水平的数据库。其次，为了评估企业所有权如何影响污染执法，PI汇编了283个城市所有主要污染企业的个别企业特征数据。PI项目，然后使用与监管机构（地方官员）和监管（污染企业）的访谈研究，解释定量数据揭示的模式。访谈在中国的两个地区进行，对比污染的记录，以了解如何激励执行污染管制可能会有所不同，在这两个地区。PI侧重于个别官员和工厂主的动机。本研究提供了重要的理解，激励结构，规范行政行为在威权政权。

General SummaryThis research project explains how authoritarian countries enforce pollution regulation. Moreover, this research examines the interactions between national and subnational institutions as they relate to enforcement of pollution regulation. This project examines how two major institutions have created divergent incentives structures for local bureaucrats that produce the following research questions: 1) Does the fact that budget-poor bureaucrats are dependent on polluting firms make budget-poor bureaucrats more likely to defy the central authority and protect polluters than their budget-rich counterparts?; 2)Do state ownership of firms make it easier for local officials to obtain compliance from certain polluters? By highlighting the impact of state institutions on bureaucratic behavior, this project draws attention to under-explored structural explanations for why government agents systematically defy-or obey-government leaders. It also examines the tools and strategies authoritarian leaders use to confront emerging governance crisis. Technical SummaryThis research project explains how authoritarian countries enforce pollution regulation. Moreover, this research examines the interactions between national and subnational institutions as they relate to enforcement of pollution regulation. Using China as the case of interest, this project draws on case study research and statistical analysis to ascertain when officials in China's 283 prefecture-level cities choose to punish-or protect-polluters. The quantitative component uses two original datasets to test for key variables associated with weak enforcement of pollution regulation in China: First, using NASA satellite data, the PI compiles a database on the level of pollution violations in 283 cities. Second, to assess how firm ownership affects pollution enforcement, the PI compiles data on individual firm characteristics of all major polluting firms in the 283 cities. The PI project then uses interview research with regulators (local officials) and the regulated (polluting firms) to explain the patterns revealed by quantitative data. Interviews are conducted in two regions of China with contrasting records on pollution to understand how incentives to enforce pollution regulation may vary in these two regions. The PI focuses on the motivations of individual officials and factory owners. This study provides important understanding on the incentive structure that regulates administrative behavior in authoritarian regimes.