New Logics for the Verificationistic Enterprise

该项目旨在重新审视意义的验证论理论，该理论认为命题的意义是由其验证的方法给出的，以及这种理论所隐含的逻辑原则的结果。迈克尔·达米特（Michael Dummett）广泛论证了采用这种验证论理论应该导致逻辑修正。他声称，对核查主义的认真赞同必须导致对建设性逻辑的赞同。通常假定这种构造逻辑必须是直觉逻辑。然而，该项目的主要论点如下：如果放弃不切实际的假设，那么对意义的验证主义解释并不像达米特所认为的那样，明确地指向直觉主义逻辑。相反，它为某些非经典逻辑提供了支持，这些逻辑要么还没有被清晰地看到，要么甚至还没有被发现。我的目标是详细说明这些逻辑的需求，并测试不同系统的适用性。我所提到的不合理假设是：(A)经验话语意义的验证主义理论可以采用直觉主义数学中发现的否定表征；(B)验证（数学之外的）是确定和确定的事情，因此不需要提供修正机制。就逻辑系统而言，放弃(A)指向具有所谓强否定算子的构造逻辑，而放弃(B)则要求某种非单调性。最有希望的路线似乎是纳尔逊逻辑N3的非单调版本，但我也想探索更广泛的其他可能性。我相信，这项研究将会在语言哲学、哲学逻辑、科学哲学等各个领域带来深刻的见解。我希望描述和激发一些逻辑系统，并为更普遍的哲学讨论做出贡献，例如，应该采用定量还是定性的确认概念（或可能两者都采用）的问题。

The project aims to take a fresh look at the verificationistic theory of meaning, which holds that the meaning of a proposition is given by the method of its verification, and the consequences on logical principles such a theory will imply.. That adopting such a verificationistic theory should lead to logical revision has been extensively argued by Michael Dummett. He claimed that a serious endoresement of verificationism had to result in the endorsement of a constructive logic. Usually it is assumed that this constructive logic has to be intuitionistic logic. However, the main thesis of the project is the following: If unrealistic assumptions are given up, the verificationistic account of meaning does not, as Dummett held, unequivocally point towards intuitionistic logic. Instead, it gives support to certain non-classical logics that are either not yet in clear view, or even haven't been discovered yet. It is my goal to spell out the requirements on such logics and to test different systems for their suitability. The unreasonable assumptions I mentioned are these: (A) That a verificationistic theory of meaning of empirical discourse can employ the characterization of negation found in intuitionistic mathematics; and (B) that verifications (outside of mathematics) are certain and definite affairs, such that no mechanism of revision needs to be supplied. In terms of logical systems, giving up (A) points to a constructive logic with a so-called strong negation operator, while giving up (B) calls for some kind of non-monotonicity. The most promising route seems to lead in the direction of a non-monotonic version of Nelson's logic N3, but I want to explore a wider range of other possibilities as well. I am confident that this research will bring insights in a variety of fields, such as the philosophy of language, philosophical logic and the philosophy of science. I hope to describe and motivate a number of logical systems and to contribute to more general philosophical discussions, for example to the question whether a quantitative or qualitative conception of confirmation (or possibly both) should be adopted.