EAGER: Resilient Control Systems with respect to Instrumentation Attacks: Theory and Testbed Verification

在信息物理系统中，物理工厂的操作通常由闭环控制来维持，闭环控制旨在将工厂过程变量保持在期望的范围内。任何控制系统的主要部分是其仪表，即，传感器和执行器。由于控制器和仪表之间的信息交换，控制系统的性能可能会受到对其传感器和执行器的攻击。实际上，传感器可能向控制器投射错误信息，并且致动器可能接收不期望的命令，可能导致灾难。在这项研究中，控制系统被称为弹性的，如果它识别攻击的传感器和执行器参与反馈回路，并减轻不良影响。拟议的研究的目标是开发一种理论，用于分析和设计弹性控制系统的攻击的仪器，并证明其有效性，使用高性能建筑试验台在联合技术研究中心。该项目更广泛的影响是对关键基础设施系统的网络安全的影响，如电力，电信，交通，高性能建筑，天然气，石油和水。 在这个项目中，我们考虑控制系统，其中的传感器和执行器可能会受到各种类型的仪表攻击，通过传递函数修改和/或外部欺骗信号注入。该项目包括开发以下技术：一种针对各种仪器攻击的系统脆弱性评估方法;一种最优控制器设计方法，以最小化攻击下的性能下降，同时在非攻击条件下满足期望的性能指标;一种使用同步检测方法的控制系统执行器/传感器健康评估方法;一种用于设计弹性反馈控制器的方法，该弹性反馈控制器由致动器和传感器健康状况驱动以检测、识别和减轻仪表攻击;一种用于基于多个传感器的过程变量估计的知识融合和基于知识融合结果的控制信号计算的方法。从复原力的角度来看，该项目将大大加强CPS领域。

In a cyber-physical system, the operation of the physical plant is typically maintained by closed-loop control, which is intended to keep the plant process variables in a desired range. A major part of any control system is its instrumentation, i.e., sensors and actuators. Due to information exchange between the controller and the instrumentation, the control system performance may be compromised by attacks on its sensors and actuators. Indeed, the sensors may project erroneous information to the controller and the actuators may receive undesirable commands, possibly leading to a catastrophe. In this research, the control system is referred to as resilient, if it identifies attacks on the sensors and actuators involved in the feedback loops and mitigates undesirable effects. The goal of the proposed research is to develop a theory for analysis and design of resilient control systems with respect to attacks on the instrumentation and to demonstrate its efficacy using the High Performance Building Testbed at the United Technologies Research Center. The broader impact of the project is in its effect on cyber-security of critical infrastructure systems, such as power, telecommunications, transportation, high performance buildings, gas, oil, and water. In this project, we consider control systems, in which the sensors and actuators may be under various types of instrumentation attacks through transfer function modification and/or external deception signal injection. This project include developing the following techniques: A method for system vulnerability evaluation with respect to various instrumentation attacks; a method for optimal controller design to minimize performance degradation under attacks, while meeting desired performance specifications under non-attacked condition; a method for actuator/sensor health assessment in control systems using the synchronous detection approach; a method for design of resilient feedback controllers, driven by the actuator and sensor health to detect, identify, and mitigate instrumentation attacks; a method for knowledge fusion for process variable estimation based on multiple sensors and control signal calculation based on the knowledge fusion results. The project will significantly enhance the field of CPS from the point of view of resiliency.