Dynamic Pricing and Matching with Asymmetric Information

该奖项资助两个经济理论项目的研究。第一部分考察了垄断者如何在一段时间内选择价格，重点是产品市场的垄断力量如何影响企业在一段时间内对生产技术做出决策。第二个课题是在一般领域的机制设计，资源分配方法的设计。具体应用于不完全信息下的匹配市场，该工作可以为我们如何设计分配方法提供新的思路，从而导致稳定的结果。这项研究通过开发新方法推动了科学的发展，这些新方法可用于分析各种情况，从是否监管耐用品垄断者，到劳动力市场如何更好地帮助雇主找到合适的员工。第一个项目探讨具有一般市场需求和生产技术的环境下垄断者的动态定价策略。目的是表征垄断力与生产技术之间的关系，并研究动态模型中消费者和生产者剩余与静态模型中的差异。这项工作将为快速增长的耐用品动态定价实证经济学文献提供一个新的和更普遍的基础。第二个项目旨在推进对信息不完全匹配市场的核心和稳定性的研究。研究议程包括对现有概念进行实际相关的改进，寻找配对稳定概念的动态博弈基础，表征核心与稳定之间的精确关系，分析各种环境下的稳定匹配，如投资成本高和隐藏类型。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

This award funds research on two projects in economic theory. The first examines how a monopolist will choose prices over time, with a focus on how monopoly power in the product market affects how the firm makes decisions over time about production technologies. The second project is in the general area of mechanism design, the design of methods to allocate recourses. The specific application is in matching markets under incomplete information, and the work could give us new ideas about how to design allocation methods that will lead to stable outcomes. The research advances science by developing new methods that can be used to analyze situations from whether to regulate a durable goods monopolist to how labor markets can do a better job of helping employers find the right employees.The first project explores dynamic pricing strategies of monopolists in environments with general market demands and production technologies. The goal is to characterize the relationship between monopoly power and production technology, and study how the consumer and producer surpluses in dynamic models differ from the static model. This work will provide a new and more general foundation for the fast growing literature in empirical economics on dynamic pricing of durable goods. The second project seeks to advance the study of the core and stability in matching markets with incomplete information. The research agenda includes offering practically relevant refinements of existing concepts, finding dynamic game foundations of the concept of pairwise stability, characterizing the precise relationship between the core and stability, and analyzing stable matchings in various environments such as those with costly investment and hidden types.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.