Collaborative Research: Empirical Models of Supracompetitive Pricing in Differentiated Products Markets

这项研究研究了价格和价格-成本利润率的大小和决定因素，为合并执行和卡特尔的检测提供了经验教训。大多数实证研究认为，价格是由公司的产品组合、消费者对产品差异化的看法，以及更重要的是，完全基于当前市场状况的竞争决定的。然而，当企业预计在未来竞争时，贴现率足够低，未来价格战的威胁可以支持比静态定价模型预测的更高的价格。该项目从两个方面探讨了这一理论。首先，研究人员建立并估计了寡头垄断价格领先的重复博弈模型。模型中的假设是由一家公司向联盟提出加价的行业实践所推动的。然后，该模型被用来理解合并如何改变定价激励。其次，研究人员开发了一种静态竞争测试，该测试对公司在另一种假设下的确切定价方式是稳健的。这项研究说明了这两种方法的实证应用。这项研究描述了价格领先模型中的均衡，描述了在给定价格、数量和需求估计数据的情况下边际成本可以收回的条件，以及可以识别企业隐含时间偏好的条件。调查人员将该模型应用于美国酿酒行业，并研究米勒/库尔斯合资企业如何改变定价激励。静态纳什竞争检验考虑了单个企业的产品差异化和多产品所有权。这一测试适用于美国的金枪鱼罐头市场，最近三家最大的公司中有两家承认操纵价格。这项研究展示了如何使用该框架来：1)确定卡特尔运作的日期；2)区分卡特尔参与者和那些在竞争对手串通的情况下简单地进行最优定价的公司；3)通过将观察到的价格和可变利润与纳什-贝特朗均衡和联合利润最大化下的价格和可变利润进行比较，研究卡特尔的有效性。这一裁决反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

This research studies the magnitude and determinants of prices and price-cost margins, with lessons for merger enforcement and the detection of cartels. Most empirical research assumes prices are determined by firms' product portfolios, the extent to which consumers view products as differentiated, and, importantly, competition based solely on current market conditions. However, when firms expect to compete in the future and have sufficiently low discount rates, threats of future price wars can support higher prices than predicted by static pricing models. This project explores this theory in two ways. First, the investigators develop and estimate a repeated game model of oligopoly price leadership. The assumptions in the model are motivated by an industry practice where one firm proposes a markup to a coalition. The model is then used to understand how mergers change pricing incentives. Second, the investigators develop a test of static competition that is robust to how exactly firms set prices under the alternative hypothesis. This research illustrates both methodologies with empirical applications. This research characterizes equilibrium in the price leadership model, state conditions under which marginal costs can be recovered given data on prices, quantities, and demand estimates, and characterize conditions under which firms' implied time preferences can be identified. The investigators apply the model to the U.S. brewing industry and study how the Miller/Coors joint venture changed pricing incentives. The test for static Nash competition takes into account product differentiation and multi-product ownership by individual firms. This test is applied to the U.S. canned tuna market, where two of the three largest firms recently plead guilty to price fixing. This research shows how the framework can be used to i) date cartel operations, ii) distinguish cartel participants from firms that are simply pricing optimally given its competitors are colluding and iii) study the effectiveness of the cartel by comparing observed prices and variable profits to those that arise in Nash-Bertrand equilibrium and under joint profit maximization.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.