Fundamental assumptions of game-theoretic solution concepts

近年来，理性选择理论的决策和博弈论假设都受到了批评，主要是因为实验研究。同时，新的社会学行动理论、社会心理双重过程理论和有限理性经济学理论的明显融合，催生了跨学科行动理论的新综合。这种综合可以作为标准理论的替代，前提是该理论在其形式化程度方面成熟。这种选择的核心思想是将理性行为概念化，特别是将理性行为概念化为一种决策程序，并将其与更自动化的决策形式区分开来。新的综合提供了关于条件的各种假设，在这些条件下，本能行为而不是沉思行为，自动自发行为而不是反思计算行为，或者系统1行为而不是系统2行为。这种替代理论已经作为基本的决策理论存在；它对战略互动理论的扩展，即对基于这些原则的新博弈论可能是什么样子的问题的回答仍然没有。在这个项目中，这种新综合的两个核心思想将在战略互动的背景下进行考察。首先，综合的核心部分，即涉及自动自发或反思计算决策发生的情景条件的假设主体，应该进行实验检验。为此，我们将引用这些假设的最明确的版本，这是由Esser和Kroneberg提供的，作为新的社会学行动理论的一部分。第二系列实验将针对新综合的另一个核心理念进行实证测试，该核心理念尚未被纳入新的社会学行动理论。这是一种概念，即类似于系统2的反思性思维与其他更高级的认知功能共享某种“能量池”。具体地说，我们将通过实验测试策略互动中的表现是否以及在多大程度上受到操纵这个池的经典社会心理技巧的影响(例如：在做出决定时记住序列；进行需要自我控制的活动等)。概述的研究项目有助于对人类决策的跨学科理解，因为新综合的这两个基本原则从未在战略互动的背景下进行过系统的测试。

Both decision- and game-theoretical assumptions of rational choice theory have come under criticism in recent years, mainly due to experimental research. At the same time there is an apparent convergence of new sociological action theories, social-psychological dual-process theories and economic theories of bounded rationality, which gives birth to a new synthesis in interdisciplinary action theory. This synthesis could serve as an alternative to the standard theory, provided the theory matures in terms of its degree of formalization. The core idea of this alternative is to conceptualize rational behavior and in particular Zweckrationalität as but one decision procedure among others, and to differentiate it from more automatic forms of decision-making. The new synthesis provides a variety of hypotheses concerning the conditions, under which instinctive rather than contemplative, automatic-spontaneous rather than reflecting-calculating or system-1- rather than system-2-behavior comes about. This alternative theory exists already as rudimentary decision theory; its extension to a theory of strategic interaction, i.e., the answer to the question of how a new game theory, which is based upon these principles, might look like, still misses.In this project two core ideas of this new synthesis will be examined in the context of strategic interaction. First of all, the centerpiece of the synthesis, i.e., the body of hypotheses referring to the situational conditions under which either automatic-spontaneous or reflecting-calculating decision making occurs, shall be tested experimentally. To this end, we will recur on the most explicit version of these hypotheses, which was provided by Esser and Kroneberg as part of the new sociological action theory. A second series of experiments will be directed at an empirical test of another core idea of the new synthesis, which has not yet been included in new sociological action theories. This is the notion that system-2-like, reflective thinking shares some kind of "energy pool" with other, higher cognitive functions. Specifically, we will test experimentally whether and to what extent the performance in strategic interaction is affected by classic social-psychological techniques of manipulating this pool (e.g.: Memorizing sequences while making decisions; performing an activity that demands self-control; etc.). The sketched research project contributes to the interdisciplinary understanding of human decision-making, since these two essential principles of the new synthesis have never been tested systematically in the context of strategic interaction.