Collaborative Research: Veto Bargaining: Delegation and Non-Coasian Dynamics

这个奖项资助了关于否决权讨价还价主题的研究。否决权讨价还价指的是一个代理人或团体可以提出建议，但另一个代理人或团体必须批准它们。在社会科学的许多领域都可以找到应用：立法机构(例如美国国会)提出高管(例如总统)可以否决的法案；刑事检察官提出指控，由法官和陪审团决定是否对被告定罪；首席执行官和董事会需要股东在某些决定上签字；搜索委员会提出候选人，但是否聘用的决定权在组织的其他地方。这项研究将讨论的核心问题是，提倡者面临着关于拥有否决权的人的偏好的不确定性--相对于现状，他们愿意接受哪些提议。利用博弈论，私人投资机构将从理论上调查这种不确定性如何影响讨价还价及其结果。他们将探讨在上述一些情况下的应用和影响。希望本研究能对否决权谈判的理论和实践有所帮助，并提供一些方法论上的见解。私人投资机构将在行动或政策的“空间维度”上采用提议-否决权谈判框架，即代理人具有单峰偏好。否决权的偏好是她的私人信息。项目的第一部分将采用机制设计的方法，在建议者完全承诺的情况下，确定建议者最优的结果。这种方法无论在规范上还是在积极方面都是有用的。将连接到最佳委派。在其他方面，结果将表明，在合理条件下，不完全信息可以极大地侵蚀建议人的讨价还价能力，同时仍能产生有效的结果。将获得关于建议人的风险规避以及建议人和否决权之间偏好的一致性的比较静态数据。研究项目的第二部分将研究一个动态模型，在该模型中，建议者的承诺是有限的。也就是说，他/她不能承诺，如果目前的提案被拒绝，他/她不会在下一个时期带着提案回到否决权。项目第一部分的结果将被用来理解有限承诺是如何影响讨价还价的。当玩家有耐心时，一个熟悉的直觉是科斯动力学：无论承诺的解决方案是什么，提出者缺乏承诺都应该侵蚀他/她的讨价还价能力，并导致否决权获得她的理想结果，也许是将一些最低限度的“外部选择”回报给提出者。PI们预计，由于单峰型偏好，这种直觉在这里失败了。特别是，预计在某些情况下将会出现非柯萨斯动态，建议书将获得她的承诺回报。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并已通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

This award funds research on the topic of veto bargaining. Veto bargaining concerns situations in which one agent or group can make proposals but another must approve them. Applications can be found in many areas of the social sciences: legislatures (e.g., U.S. Congress) propose bills that executives (e.g., the President) can veto; criminal prosecutors bring charges that judges and juries decide whether to convict a defendant on; CEOs and Boards need shareholders to sign off on certain decisions; and search committees put forward candidates but the decision of whether to hire rests elsewhere in an organization. The central issue the research will take up concerns the uncertainty proposers face about the preferences of those with veto power—which proposals they are willing to accept relative to the status quo. Using game theory, the PIs will theoretically investigate how such uncertainty affects bargaining and the resulting outcomes. They will explore applications and implications in some of the contexts noted above. It is hoped that the research will contribute to both the theoretical and practical understanding of veto bargaining, and provide some methodological insights.The PIs will adopt a framework of Proposer-Vetoer bargaining over a “spatial dimension” of actions or policies; i.e., the agents have single-peaked preferences. Vetoer’s preferences are her private information. The first part of the project will take a mechanism design approach to identify Proposer-optimal outcomes when Proposer has full commitment. This approach will be useful both normatively and positively. A connection will be made to optimal delegation. Among other things, the results will show that under reasonable conditions incomplete information can dramatically corrode Proposer’s bargaining power, while still resulting in efficient outcomes. Comparative statics will be obtained concerning the Proposer’s risk aversion and the alignment of preferences between Proposer and Vetoer. The second part of the research project will study a dynamic model in which Proposer has limited commitment. That is, he/she cannot commit to not coming back to Vetoer with a proposal in the next period should the current proposal be rejected. The results from the first part of the project will be used to understand how bargaining is affected by limited commitment. A familiar intuition when players are patient is that of Coasian dynamics: regardless of the commitment solution, Proposer’s lack of commitment should erode his/her bargaining power and lead to Vetoer getting her ideal outcome, perhaps modulo some minimum “outside option” payoff to Proposer. The PIs anticipate showing that this intuition fails here, owing to single-peaked preferences. In particular, it is anticipated that under some conditions there will be non-Coasian dynamics, with Proposer obtaining her commitment payoff.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.