Collaborative Research: International Coercion, Debt Relief, and Land Transactions

项目名称：Shea， Patrick/Bunte， Jonas项目编号：2048406/2048416机构：休斯顿大学/德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校首席研究员：Patrick Shea/Jonas BunteNSF项目：安全与准备标题：合作研究国际强制、债务减免和土地交易这个项目将决定政府何时转移对部分国家领土的控制权，以偿还国际债权人的贷款债务。该项目将提供系统证据，说明影响各国政府以土地换取债务减免决定的国内和国际条件。该项目的实证分析将基于将收集的与债务减免有关的国家间所有土地交易的新数据集。这个项目的结果将有助于增进我们对各国的国际债务问题何时能够导致它们向其他国家作出领土让步的理解。该项目将开发和测试政府可以选择采用的不同债务减免策略的理论，以及为什么有时选择土地交易而不是其他可用的政策，如紧缩或违约。政府将收集2000年至2020年期间以减免债务为目的的土地交易的新的更全面的数据集。采用联立方程对新数据集进行统计分析，以检验理论命题。该项目的成果将推动以下方面的基础研究：国际债务管理、国家利用经济杠杆在安全问题上获得国家让步、以及领土让步国际谈判的动态。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

National Science FoundationAbstractProposal: 2048406/2048416 PI Name: Shea, Patrick/Bunte, JonasProposal ID: 2048406/2048416Institution: University of Houston/University of Texas at DallasPrincipal Investigator: Patrick Shea/Jonas BunteNSF Program: Security and PreparednessTitle: Collaborative Research: International Coercion, Debt Relief, and Land TransactionsThis project will determine when governments transfer control over portions of their national territory to pay off loan debts to international creditors. The project will provide systematic evidence on the domestic and international conditions that influence the decisions of governments to exchange land for debt relief. The empirical analyses in the project will be based on a new dataset to be collected on all land transactions between countries related to debt relief. The results of this project will contribute to improving our understanding of when the international debt problems of countries can lead them to make territorial concessions to other countries. The project will develop and test theory on the different debt relief strategies that governments can choose to adopt and why land transactions are sometimes selected instead of other available policies such as austerity or default. A new and more comprehensive dataset on land transactions for debt relief will be collected for the period 2000 to 2020. Statistical analyses of the new data set, employing simultaneous equations, will be conducted to test theoretical propositions. The results of the project will advance basic research on the management of international debt, the use of economic leverage by states to gain concession from states on security issues, and the dynamics of international negotiations over territorial concessions.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.