NSF-BSF: Collaborative Research: Market Conduct in Technology Adoption in the Automobile Industry

摘要反垄断执法研究大多集中在价格和数量串通上，尽管反垄断法涵盖了更多的串通方式。该项目将探讨汽车制造商串通采用排放控制技术的原因和福利后果。该项目的重点是那些被指串通采用柴油排气(DEF)油箱的汽车制造商，这些油箱太小，无法有效地清理氮氧化物(NOx)，氮氧化物是空气污染的主要贡献者。该项目将调查所谓的汽车制造商串通如何掩盖违反NOx排放法规的行为。该项目将量化所谓的串通对NOx污染损害、购车者盈余和公司利润的影响。这些影响提供了适当的反垄断惩罚，以补救此类碰撞造成的福利损害。最后，该项目将研究环境和反垄断监管是否以及如何能够缓解技术串通造成的低效。该项目将建立和估计消费者汽车需求和汽车制造商技术选择的结构模型，并模拟反事实政策。该项目利用了关于汽车价格、销售和特性的全面的新数据集。所采用的结构模型的一个新特征是，一家公司被发现违规的概率取决于其他公司的行为，也取决于自己的行为。更分散的选择分配可能会导致监管机构质疑为什么一些公司需要使用大型DEF坦克，而另一些公司显然使用小型坦克。通过协调小型油箱，汽车制造商同时降低了被监管机构发现的可能性，并使他们的车辆对购车者更具吸引力(因为油箱减少了货物空间，这是一个宝贵的车辆特征)。利用消费者品味和汽车制造商成本的模型和估计，该项目将进行反事实模拟，以探索以下问题：(I)量化加强排放标准执行的好处；(Ii)计算技术合谋相对于竞争性反事实的反竞争损害；以及(Iii)确定最有利于技术合谋的需求和供给条件。该项目推进了经济学研究，并对公司串通、反垄断执法和行业标准产生了监管和政策影响。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

AbstractAntitrust enforcement research has mostly focused on price and quantity collusion, even though antitrust law encompasses more ways to collude. This project will explore the causes and welfare consequences of automakers colluding on the adoption of emission control technologies. The project focuses on automakers that have been alleged to have colluded on adopting Diesel Exhaust Fluid (DEF) tanks that were too small to effectively clean up nitrogen oxide (NOx), a major contributor to air pollution. The project will investigate how the alleged collusion by automakers concealed violation of NOx emissions regulation. The project will quantify the effects of the alleged collusion on NOx pollution damages, car buyer surplus, and firm profits. These effects inform the proper amount of antitrust penalties to remedy welfare damages of such collisions. Finally, the project will examine whether and how environmental and antitrust regulation can mitigate inefficiencies from technology collusion. The project will build and estimate a structural model of consumer vehicle demand and automaker technology choice, and simulate counterfactual policies. The project utilizes a comprehensive new data set on vehicle prices, sales, and characteristics. A novel feature of the employed structural model is that the probability of non-compliance detection for one firm depends on other firms' behavior as well as its own. A more dispersed distribution in choices may cause a regulator to question why some firms need to use large DEF tanks while others apparently manage with small tanks. By coordinating on small tanks, the automakers simultaneously reduce the probability of being detected by the regulator and make their vehicles more attractive to car buyers (as the tank reduces cargo space, a valuable vehicle feature). With the model and estimates of consumer tastes and automaker costs, the project will conduct counterfactual simulation to explore the following issues: (i) quantify the benefit of strengthening the enforcement of emission standards; (ii) calculate the anti-competitive damage of technology collusion compared to the competitive counterfactual; and (iii) identify the demand and supply conditions most conducive to technology collusion. The project advances the economics research and has regulatory and policy implications on firm collusion, antitrust enforcement, and industry standards.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.