Conceptual change as a form of cognitive dynamics

这个项目的目的是发展一种作为认知动力学形式的概念变化的哲学解释。哲学的中心任务是将我们自己理解为能够在精神上和语言上代表世界并获得关于世界的全面和系统的知识的存在。对于像我们这样有限且容易犯错误的人来说，获得这样的世界观是一个漫长的过程，使我们的认知系统适应我们从他人那里获得的信息和我们所做的经验：一个认知变化的过程。认知变化的两种基本形式是信念变化和观念变化。信念改变是对信念系统的改变，这种改变是通过在其中添加或删除信念而产生的。相比之下，概念变化是概念系统的变化，它是我们信仰内容的来源。这项研究有了新的突破：到目前为止，对作为一种普遍现象的认知动力学的哲学研究几乎完全局限于信念变化的问题，而对概念变化的哲学研究则局限于科学知识的特殊情况。作为一种普遍的认知现象，以往对概念变化问题的研究不是在哲学上进行的，而主要是在发展心理学和科学教育中进行的。在第一步中，确定了概念变化的基本特征，并展示了概念变化与其他形式的认知动力学的不同。其中一个主导思想是，必须区分两种概念变化。以往的研究主要关注的是概念的变化，即概念被其他相似的概念所取代。这种概念变化是由不可通约性的概念定义的。另一种概念变化是特定概念本身的质变。这第二种概念变化也是认知动力学的一种基本形式。在第二个步骤中，对概念变化过程的“逻辑”进行了说明。它展示了这两种概念变化是如何可能的，以及哪些认知能力使其成为可能。最后，通过建立认知科学中已发展的意向性概念变化模型来解决概念进步和理性概念变化的问题。研究表明，概念变化是一种认知过程，在一定程度上可以对原因作出反应并进行反思控制。总体目标是通过将理性信念改变理论与理性概念改变理论相统一来全面理解认知动力学。

The aim of this project is to develop a philosophical account of conceptual change as a form of cognitive dynamics. It is a central task of philosophy to provide an understanding of ourselves as beings who are able to mentally and linguistically represent the world and acquire comprehensive and systematic knowledge about it. For finite and fallible beings like us, the acquisition of such a world view is a lengthy process of adapting our cognitive system to the information we receive from others and to the experiences we make: a process of cognitive change. The two basic forms of cognitive change are belief change and conceptual change. Belief change is a change of a belief system that results from adding beliefs to it or deleting beliefs from it. Conceptual change, by contrast, is a change in the conceptual system that is the source of the contents of our beliefs. The study breaks new ground: Philosophical studies of cognitive dynamics as a general phenomenon have so far been confined almost entirely to the problem of belief change and philosophical studies of conceptual change have been limited to the special case of scientific knowledge. Previous investigations of the problem of conceptual change as a general cognitive phenomenon have been carried through not in philosophy but primarily in developmental psychology and science education. In a first step, the basic characteristics of conceptual change are determined and it is shown how conceptual change differs from other forms of cognitive dynamics. One of the leading ideas is that two kinds of conceptual change have to be distinguished. The kind of conceptual change that previous studies have exclusively focused on is the replacement of concepts by other, similar, concepts. This kind of conceptual change is defined by the notion of incommensurability. The other kind of conceptual change is the qualitative change of particular concepts themselves. It is claimed that this second kind of conceptual change is also a basic form of cognitive dynamics. In a second step, an account of the "logic" of the process of conceptual change is given. It is shown how conceptual change of both kinds is possible and by which cognitive abilities it is enabled. Finally, the problems of conceptual progress and rational conceptual change are tackled by building on models of intentional conceptual change that have been developed in cognitive science. It is shown that conceptual change is a form of cognitive process that can be, to a certain degree, responsive to reasons and reflective control. The overarching goal is to reach a comprehensive understanding of cognitive dynamics by unifying the theory of rational belief change with a theory of rational conceptual change.