Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Non-isolation and Social Preference

日常生活中经常会出现这样的场景，人们需要根据当前和以前的互动来确定对他人的“公平程度”。决定是否为下一个人开门，让某人在交通中合并，或者在螃蟹盛宴上拿走最后一只螃蟹，这些都是日常生活中的场景，可能取决于一个人以前的公平程度。多轮公平性也会在实验室中实验性地发生，并在更高风险和经济相关环境中自然地发生。管理者必须决定下属（可能还有他们自己）的奖金，这些决定可能取决于也可能不取决于他们过去的奖金决定。在职业棒球中，不成文的规则规定了球员何时应该“投球”以帮助对方球队，尽管可能会损失数十万美元的奖励。本项目将使用实验室实验来研究这种动态公平问题的特征。除了测试动态公平的问题，我们还研究了相关实验环境中的支付方法问题。当受试者被反复询问问题以提供更多数据时，实验室实验中常见的节约成本措施是随机选择一个决策问题进行支付。这种方法的可靠性，而常用的，是依赖于一个主题的动态公平的关注。标准的分析假设没有动态：每个选择问题都被孤立地看待。当实验者不知道受试者的关注点时，假设孤立可能会导致对受试者偏好的错误结论。因此，本项目还将调查支付方法论在公平性实验设计方面的稳健性。本研究通过使用最简单的方法更好地理解，对风险下的社会偏好和实验方法论的文献机构做出了三倍贡献：（i）个人如何在特定的动态公平设置中做出选择，（ii）风险下社会偏好的理论模型最能代表实际数据，（iii）隔离在社会偏好实验中扮演了多大的角色。该项目将使用上述“随机问题选择”（RPS）支付机制，在两轮实验中对非隔离的存在进行实验性测试。每一轮将是一个二元结果独裁者游戏，其中一个主题将选择两个选项之一，在他们自己和另一个匿名主题之间分配一份钱。特别是，这个实验问是否有以前选择一个公平的（分别。不公平的）替代结果产生了选择不公平的（相应地，公平）下一轮的结果。这种类型的动态反应被称为“选择逆转”，它表明了非隔离。然而，实验的动态性质不可避免地会导致选择偏差。为了克服这一挑战，实验使用了一个可能的早期决议的RPS计划，这可以关闭RPS在后来的选择的影响，同时诱导受试者的选择RPS下的早期选择的程序。因此，受试者在后面几轮中的选择不会受到他们之前几轮选择的概率影响，然后可以将其与对照组进行比较。请注意，非隔离和逆转是两个独立的概念：不隔离问题的主体不一定会引起逆转。因此，重点将是共同测试非隔离和反转行为的存在。同时，实验的参数被选择来区分三类风险下的社会偏好模型。动态公平关注是经济相关的个人决策问题及其各自的福利分析的重要因素。这项研究对理解这些问题的根本贡献将为应用经济学家和理论经济学家提供适当的模型选择建议。对于实验经济学家来说，这项研究将为在这种动态环境中通用RPS支付机制的适用性提供深入了解。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

Daily life regularly consists of scenarios where one needs to determine “how fair” to be to others based on current and previous interactions. Deciding whether to hold the door open for the next person, let someone merge ahead in traffic, or take the last crab at a crab feast are all everyday scenarios that could depend on how fair one has been previously. Multiple rounds of fairness also occur both experimentally in the lab and naturally in the field in higher stakes and economically relevant environments. Managers must decide on bonuses among subordinates (and potentially themselves), and these decisions may or may not depend on their past bonus decisions. In professional baseball, unwritten rules dictate when players should “take a pitch” to help the other team, despite potentially losing hundreds of thousands of dollars in incentives. This project will examine the features of such dynamic fairness concerns using a laboratory experiment. In addition to testing dynamic fairness concerns, we also examine the methodological issue of payment in relevant experimental settings. When subjects are repeatedly asked questions to provide more data, a common cost-saving measure in laboratory experiments is to randomly choose one decision problem for payment. The reliability of this method, while commonly used, is dependent on a subject’s dynamic fairness concerns. The standard analysis assumes that there are no dynamics: each choice problem is viewed in isolation. When the experimenter does not know a subject’s concerns, assuming isolation could give rise to incorrect conclusions about that subject’s preferences. Therefore, this project will also investigate payment methodology’s robustness in terms of experimental design on fairness.This research contributes threefold to the bodies of literature in social preferences under risk and experimental methodology by using the simplest way to better understand: (i) how individuals make choices in a specific dynamic fairness settings, (ii) which theoretical model(s) of social preference under risk best represent actual data, and (iii) how much of a role isolation plays in social preference experiments. This project will experimentally test the presence of non-isolation in a two-round experiment using the aforementioned “random problem selection” (RPS) payment mechanism. Each round will be a binary outcome dictator game, where a subject will choose one of two options to split a share of money between themselves and another anonymous subject. In particular, this experiment asks whether having previously chosen a fair (resp. unfair) alternative outcome creates a tendency to choose an unfair (resp. fair) outcome for the next round. This type of dynamic response is labeled a “choice reversal”, and it identifies non-isolation. However, the dynamic nature of the experiment inevitably induces selection bias. To overcome this challenge, the experiment uses a procedure with possible early resolution of the RPS scheme, which can shut down the effect of RPS in later choice while inducing subject’s choice under RPS for earlier choice. Therefore, the subject's choice in later rounds will not be affected probabilistically from their earlier round choice, which can then be compared to the control group. Note that non-isolation and reversals are two separate concepts: subjects who do not isolate the problem do not necessarily give rise to reversals. Therefore, the focus will be to jointly test the existence of non-isolation and reversal behavior. Simultaneously, the parameters of the experiment are chosen to distinguish between three classes of models of social preferences under risk. Dynamic fairness concerns are important factors in economically-relevant individual decision-making problems and their respective welfare analyses. This research's fundamental contributions to understanding these concerns will advise both applied and theoretical economists on appropriate model selection. For the experimental economist, this research will provide insight into the applicability of the common RPS payment mechanism in such dynamic settings.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.