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NSF Convergence Accelerator Track G: 5G Traffic Sovereignty: Operating Through an Adversarial Internet

NSF Convergence Accelerator Track G: 5G Traffic Sovereignty: Operating Through an Adversarial Internet
NSF 融合加速器轨道 G:5G 流量主权:通过对抗性互联网进行操作
批准号:
2226460
负责人:
Alexander Marder
金额:
$75.0万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2022
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2022-07-15 至 2023-12-31

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
5G无线技术具有改变国防部关键任务操作的潜力,但要充分利用这一机会,需要通过全球商业网络运行的新技术。将关键任务设备连接到商用5G网络将改变国防部通信,但它也通过将流量暴露在整个互联网上,增加了敏感和关键通信的攻击面。民族国家拥有几乎取之不尽的资源,可以通过其控制下的网络基础设施中断流量或被动识别通信模式,而零信任架构中的验证信任范式无法阻止这些攻击。5G领域的任何安全通信解决方案都必须考虑到穿越可能由敌对民族国家控制的网络和路由器的对抗性互联网路径。从本质上讲,通过5G网络运营不仅需要关注无线最后一跳,还需要关注到达最后一跳的互联网路径。该项目结合了三个组成部分,以创造前所未有的能力,利用商用5G网络实现安全和弹性通信。第一个组件利用可编程数据平面来促进路径测量,并将通信转移到可信赖的路径上,而无需修改国防部应用程序、现有网络设备或第三方网络。组件2创建了一个自动测量应用程序,该应用程序与组件1的路由器接口,以识别避免攻击的路由器级路径,并实时验证活动流的通信路径是否符合预期。第三部分将为国防部推荐将安全通信路径扩展到5G网络的方法。最后一个组件将确定高价值网络,其包含在工业信任区域中可以使国防部受益,并应用现有的地缘政治影响框架来评估国防部和地理区域之间的可信通信路径。解决这个问题需要在六个专业领域进行融合研究:路径评估的网络测量;5G通信和运输;可编程开关实现;现实评价平台;5g连接基础设施的安全约束;以及网络领域的地缘政治影响和战略。这种跨学科和跨部门的合作针对的是一个长期未解决的挑战,而5G生态系统的重要性被放大了:自动选择5G设备的通信路径,以避免可能由民族国家对手控制的网络、位置或硬件。该项目将通过补充零信任架构和安全的5G实施,并为国防部和关键基础设施如何通过爆炸性但危险的不透明5G生态系统运行提供一种变革性方法,从而产生广泛的影响。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命,并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估,被认为值得支持。
英文摘要
5G wireless technology has the potential to transform DOD mission-critical operations, but taking full advantage of this opportunity requires new techniques to operate through commercial networks worldwide. Connecting mission-critical devices to commercial 5G networks will transform DOD communications, but it also increases the attack surface for sensitive and critical communications by exposing the traffic to the Internet at large. Nation-states have nearly inexhaustible resources to disrupt traffic or passively recognize communications patterns via network infrastructure under their control, and the verified-trust paradigm in a zero-trust architecture cannot prevent these attacks. Any secure communication solution in the 5G space must account for adversarial Internet paths that traverse networks and routers that are potentially controlled by adversary nation-states. In essence, operating through 5G networks requires not just focusing on the wireless last hop, but also the Internet paths to reach the last hop.This project combines three components to create an unprecedented ability to leverage commercial 5G networks for secure and resilient communication. The first component takes advantage of programmable data planes to facilitate path measurements – and shift communications onto trustworthy paths – without modifying DOD applications, existing network devices, or third-party networks. Component 2 creates an automated measurement application that interfaces with the router from Component 1 to identify router-level paths that avoid adversaries, as well as verify in real-time that communication paths for active flows behave as expected. Component 3 will recommend ways for DOD to expand the availability of secure communication paths to 5G networks. This last component will identify high-value networks whose inclusion in an industry zone-of-trust could benefit DOD, and apply existing geopolitical influence frameworks to evaluate trustworthy communication paths between DOD and geographic regions. Tackling this problem requires convergence research across six areas of expertise: network measurement for path assessment; 5G communication and transport; programmable switch implementation; realistic evaluation platforms; security constraints of 5G-connected infrastructure; and geopolitical influence and strategy in the cyber domain. This interdisciplinary and cross-sector collaboration targets a persistently unsolved challenge that the 5G ecosystem amplifies in importance: automatic selection of communication paths with 5G devices to avoid networks, locations, or hardware potentially controlled by a nation-state adversary. This project will provide broad impact by complementing zero-trust architectures and secure 5G implementations, and by offering a transformative approach to how DoD and critical infrastructure can operate through the exploding yet dangerously opaque 5G ecosystem.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
期刊论文(4)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Access Denied: Assessing Physical Risks to Internet Access Networks
访问被拒绝:评估互联网访问网络的物理风险
DOI: --
发表时间: 2023
期刊: USENIX Association
影响因子: --
作者: [Alexander Marder, Zesen Zhang, Ricky Mok, Ramakrishna Padmanabhan, Bradley Huffaker, Matthew Luckie, Alberto Dainotti, kc claffy, Alex C. Snoeren, Aaron Schulman]
通讯作者: Aaron Schulman
On the Importance of Being an AS: An Approach to Country-Level AS Rankings
论成为 AS 的重要性:国家级 AS 排名的方法
DOI: --
发表时间: 2023
期刊: ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC
影响因子: --
作者: [Huffaker, Bradley, Fontugne, Romain, Marder, Alexander, claffy, kc]
通讯作者: claffy, kc
Coarse-grained Inference of BGP Community Intent
BGP 社区意图的粗粒度推断
DOI: --
发表时间: 2023
期刊: ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC
影响因子: --
作者: [Krenc, Thomas, Luckie, Matthew, Marder, Alexander, claffy, kc]
通讯作者: claffy, kc
NSF Convergence Accelerator Track G: AVOID 5G: Automated Verification Of Internet Data-paths for 5G
  • 批准号:
    2326928
  • 项目类别:
    Cooperative Agreement
  • 资助金额:
    $500.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 负责人:
    Alexander Marder
  • 依托单位:
CRII: CNS: Cloud Cartography: Measurement Capabilities for the Modern Internet
  • 批准号:
    2105393
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $17.5万
  • 财政年份:
    2021
  • 负责人:
    Alexander Marder
  • 依托单位:
海外基金