Doxastic Agency and Epistemic Responsibility

该项目从认识论的角度考察了一些重要的概念，即“道义代理”和“认识论责任”。持有信念和拥有知识的认知型主体，不仅被视为对命题持某种精神态度的娱乐性主体，而且被视为能够做出选择的代理人。这是当今哲学中的一个中心话题：一方面，当代理论哲学深入研究了责任的实践维度与代理和知识的实践维度之间的联系；另一方面，当代认识论发展了许多涉及这些概念的理论。该项目的目的是将认识论辩论中假定的基本概念与一种正式机制结合起来，以便对这些概念作出准确的定义，并严格检查有效的原则和可核查的陈述。该项目从哲学逻辑的角度探讨了主体的认知责任。特别是，该项目的目的是在三个关键问题上提供澄清和新的见解：(I)被动接收最新信息和主动搜索信息之间的关键区别；(Ii)我们本来可以形成我们的信念的想法与对我们行为的评估之间的联系；(Iii)在证词相信的情况下认知劳动的分配。虽然该项目的方法论是正式的，但它所处理的问题是理论哲学中的关键问题，它们与认识论中的一些最重要的主题有关。所考虑的道教中介形式有助于我们形成信仰的实践，它们给了我们在这一事业中的积极作用。Doxastic代理可以被证明是可靠的或不可靠的，在这两种情况下(但在第二种情况下更为紧迫)，另一种信念形成的机会被证明是评估代理的认知表现的关键。特别是，为了评估代理人的认知责任，这种机会似乎是至关重要的。在这个项目中，可靠的信念形成的概念将被调查并给出形式表达。将道家代理纳入代理的模态逻辑和情态认知逻辑，本研究的总体目标是对认知责任进行一种新的、概念上持续的、详细的形式解释，其实质是适当地行使道家控制。

The project investigates some important concepts from epistemology, namely "doxastic agency" and "epistemic responsibility." Epistemic subjects, who hold beliefs and possess knowledge, are regarded not only as entertaining certain mental attitudes toward propositions, but as agents capable of making choices. This topic is today a central one in philosophy: on the one hand, contemporary theoretical philosophy has deeply investigated the connection between the practical dimension of responsibility and that of agency and knowledge; on the other hand, contemporary epistemology has developed a number of theories that deal with the these concepts. This project aims at integrating the basic concepts assumed in the epistemological debate with a formal apparatus that allows for a precise definition of such concepts and the rigorous checking of valid principles and verifiable statements. The project approaches epistemic responsibility of agents from the perspective of philosophical logic. In particular, the aim of the project is to provide clarification and new insights on three key issues: (i) the crucial distinction between a passive reception of updates and an active search for information; (ii) the connection between the idea that we could have formed our beliefs otherwise and the assessment of our conduct; (iii) the distribution of cognitive labor in cases of testimonial belief. While the methodology of the project is formal, the problems it deals with are key problems in theoretical philosophy, and they are connected with some of the most important topics in epistemology. The considered forms of doxastic agency contribute to our practice of belief formation and they give us an active role in this enterprise. Doxastic agency can prove reliable or unreliable, and in both cases (but more pressingly in the second one), the chance for an alternative belief formation proves essential in assessing the agent's epistemic performance. In particular, such a chance seems to be crucial in order to assess the epistemic responsibility of the agent. In this project, the notion of a reliable belief formation will be investigated and given formal expression. In bringing doxastic agency into the modal logic of agency and modal epistemic logic, the overall aim of this research is a new, conceptually sustained and detailed formal account of epistemic responsibility, which essentially refers to the appropriate exercise of doxastic control.