Limited liability for corporate torts

研究建议--公司侵权的有限责任--涉及公司法的核心要素：有限责任制度。这一概念指的是一种责任架构，根据该架构，尽管公司本身是一个法人实体，但对其所有资产负有责任，股东个人资产免除对公司债务的责任。这样的责任架构得到了广泛的认可，因为公司法几乎为所有法律制度所熟知。该项目旨在提供对有限责任的基本分析，重点放在非自愿债权人，即没有故意选择公司作为债务人的债权人。在德国法规中，这种侵权债权人被称为因非法行为而产生的债权的持有人(原文：Forderungen Aus unerlabten Handlugen)。应从法律现实主义和经济角度调查在多大程度上可以对非自愿债权人承担有限责任。长期以来，有限责任一直受到批评，认为它创造了外部性，将责任风险从公司股东转移到公司债权人身上。在非自愿债权人的情况下，这一问题变得最为紧迫，有限责任公司债务人实际上被强加于非自愿债权人，而没有对冲或减轻现有破产风险的余地。因此，表面上看，低效和社会有害的行为受到了激励，收益和风险之间的经济联系正在被切断，侵权法的运作受到了威胁。该项目设想以两种方式跟进刚刚概述的经济批评：第一，深化有限责任的理论知识，第二，将经济分析的结果转化为法律术语和分类法。理论研究将利用统计学和行为经济学等工具，对有限责任进行定性和定量的成本效益分析。作为一种法律假设，应提出公司侵权无限责任的比例，并与现有的法律和学说相联系。如果采用这种双重办法，我们对有限责任和因非法行为而提出的索赔及其相互作用和理由的了解将大大增加。此外，该项目中推行的新责任计划将提供一种工具，以实施和加强公司社会责任的国际公共法律原则。

The research proposal -Limited liability for corporate torts- concerns the very core element of corporate law: the institution of limited liability. This concept refers to a liability architecture, according to which, notwithstanding the corporation itself as a legal entity being liable with all its assets, shareholders personal assets are exempt from liability for corporate debts. Such a liability architecture is widely recognized at corporate laws being known to virtually every legal system. The project aims at providing a fundamental analysis of limited liability, focusing on involuntary creditors, i.e. creditors that did not deliberately select the corporation as their debtor. In German statutes, such tort creditors are called holders of -claims resulting from illicit acts- (orig.: Forderungen aus unerlaubten Handlungen). It shall be investigated both from a legal realist and economic point of view to what extent limited liability can be upheld against involuntary creditors. Limited liability has been subject to the long-standing criticism that it creates externalities, shifting liability risks from corporate shareholders to corporate creditors. This problem becomes most pressing in the case of involuntary creditors upon whom the limited liability corporate debtor is effectively imposed without there being room in order to hedge or mitigate the incumbent insolvency risk. Hence, prima facie, inefficient and socially harmful behaviour is incentivised, the economic link between gain and risk is being severed and the functioning of tort law is jeopardised. The project envisages to follow up on the economic criticism just outlined in two ways: First, theoretical knowledge of limited liability shall be deepened, while, second, the results of economic analysis shall be translated into legal terms and taxonomies. Theoretical investigations will provide a qualitative and quantitative cost-benefit-analysis of limited liability, using inter alia statistics and behavioural economics. As a legal hypothesis, unlimited liability pro rata for corporate torts shall be posed and linked with existing law and doctrine. Using this two-fold approach, hopefully, our understanding of limited liability and claims resulting from illicit acts as well as their interaction and rationales will grow considerably. Plus, the new liability scheme pursued in this project will offer a tool in order to implement and strengthen public international legal principles of corporate social responsibility.