Corporate and Managerial Liability: Empirical and Experimental Analysis

该项目涉及对公司负债和管理负债的两个独立的实证分析。首先分析了新的联邦组织量刑指南下对公司的刑事量刑。这项研究将新准则与现有做法和最优公司责任进行了比较。该项目还分析了公司缓刑(非货币制裁)的使用情况以及对公司不当行为负有责任的个人的命运。第二个项目关注的是经理人针对股东的不当行为。这项研究考察了施加于经理的受托责任的性质，以促使他们勤奋地履行自己的工作(谨慎行事)，而不为自己的目的挪用公司的资产(忠诚义务)。经济理论认为，这些关税是相同的，但法律对待它们的方式不同。第二个子项目将使用实验方法测试法律上的区别。实验对象作为委托人或代理人，随机确定，玩一个两阶段博弈。在第一个阶段，参与者对决定是否将他们的资产合并到一个联合项目中。在第二种情况下，代理人有机会挪用资产。核心命题将通过评估受试者在扣留自己的资产时是否建立了与挪用他人资产时不同的惩罚(关爱与忠诚)来检验。第一个分项目将在准则颁布之前使用一个关于公司量刑的数据库，并自那以后创建一个关于量刑的类似数据集。这项研究的结果将促进关于联邦法院对公司犯罪量刑的社会法学理论，并促进或了解人们的行为如何符合或不符合管理责任的法律概念。%这个项目涉及对公司负债和管理负债的两个独立的经验分析。首先分析了新的联邦组织量刑指南下对公司的刑事量刑。这项研究将新准则与现有做法和最优公司责任进行了比较。该项目还分析了公司缓刑(非货币制裁)的使用情况以及对公司不当行为负有责任的个人的命运。第二个项目关注的是经理人针对股东的不当行为。这项研究考察了施加于经理的受托责任的性质，以促使他们勤奋地履行自己的工作(谨慎行事)，而不为自己的目的挪用公司的资产(忠诚义务)。经济理论认为，这些关税是相同的，但法律对待它们的方式不同。第二个子项目将使用实验方法测试法律上的区别。实验对象作为委托人或代理人，随机确定，玩一个两阶段博弈。在第一个阶段，参与者对决定是否将他们的资产合并到一个联合项目中。在第二种情况下，代理人有机会挪用资产。核心命题将通过评估受试者在扣留自己的资产时是否建立了与挪用他人资产时不同的惩罚(关爱与忠诚)来检验。第一个分项目将在准则颁布之前使用一个关于公司量刑的数据库，并自那以后创建一个关于量刑的类似数据集。这项研究的结果将促进关于联邦法院对公司犯罪量刑的社会法学理论，并促进或了解人们的行为如何符合或不符合管理责任的法律概念。

This project involves two separate empirical analyses of corporate and managerial liability. The first analyzes criminal sentencing of corporations under the new federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. The research compares the new Guidelines to existing practice and to optimal corporate liability. The project also analyses the use of corporate probation (nonmonetary sanctions) as well as the fate of the individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing. The second project focuses on wrongdoing by managers against shareholders. The research examines the nature of fiduciary duties imposed on managers to induce them to perform their jobs diligently (take `due care`) and not misappropriate the firm's assets for their own purposes (`duty of loyalty`). Economic theory suggests that these duties are the same, yet the law treats them differently. This second subproject will test the legal distinction using experimental methods. Experimental subjects serve as principals or agents, randomly determined, and play a two-stage game. In the first, the pairs of participants decide if they will combine their assets in a joint project. In the second, the agent has an opportunity to misappropriate assets. The central proposition will be tested by evaluating whether subjects establish different penalties when withholding their own assets than when misappropriating the assets of the other (care vs. Loyalty). The first subproject will use a database on corporate sentencing prior to the enactment of the Guidelines and create an analogous dataset on sentencing since. The results of this research will advance sociolegal theory about corporate criminal sentencing in federal courts and advance or knowledge of how people's behavior does or does not conform to legal notions of managerial duty. %%% This project involves two separate empirical analyses of corporate and managerial liability. The first analyzes criminal sentencing of corporations under the new federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. The research compares the new Guidelines to existing practice and to optimal corporate liability. The project also analyses the use of corporate probation (nonmonetary sanctions) as well as the fate of the individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing. The second project focuses on wrongdoing by managers against shareholders. The research examines the nature of fiduciary duties imposed on managers to induce them to perform their jobs diligently (take `due care`) and not misappropriate the firm's assets for their own purposes (`duty of loyalty`). Economic theory suggests that these duties are the same, yet the law treats them differently. This second subproject will test the legal distinction using experimental methods. Experimental subjects serve as principals or agents, randomly determined, and play a two-stage game. In the first, the pairs of participants decide if they will combine their assets in a joint project. In the second, the agent has an opportunity to misappropriate assets. The central proposition will be tested by evaluating whether subjects establish different penalties when withholding their own assets than when misappropriating the assets of the other (care vs. Loyalty). The first subproject will use a database on corporate sentencing prior to the enactment of the Guidelines and create an analogous dataset on sentencing since. The results of this research will advance sociolegal theory about corporate criminal sentencing in federal courts and advance or knowledge of how people's behavior does or does not conform to legal notions of managerial duty.