The concept of matter in Aristotle

亚里士多德经常被认为是引入了物质概念(GR。海尔)融入哲学。然而，人们并不完全清楚在他的文本中“物质”是什么意思。亚里士多德的定义和规范似乎晦涩难懂，有时甚至不一致。学者们也得出了截然相反的结果；他们的解释从认为亚里士多德的物质是抽象的形而上学原则，在现实中永远不存在，到认为物质总是构成单个物质的特定的感性物质，例如青铜或肉和骨。我研究的特别焦点在于亚里士多德为什么引入物质的概念，即他试图通过引入和进一步规定这个概念来解决哪些本体论问题。我认为亚里士多德引入物质是为了解释个体物质的产生。因此，他的理论不仅反对那些普遍否认改变的可能性的观点，而且特别反对将一个新的个体的发生描述为不是实质性改变的情况，而是作为一种单一事物的意外修改，或者作为一种新的性质组合的观点。根据亚里士多德的观点，只有当我们对物质有足够的概念时，我们才能理解一个新的个体的发生是一个实质性变化的案例。在一个实质性的变化中，物质是一个单独的物质出现并继续存在--以一种尚未被描述的特定方式--在该单独的物质中。我进一步认为，亚里士多德将所谓的构思的事物与合理的东西联系起来；他给出的典型例子包括青铜或月经。它们不是单独的物质，但它们具有一种特殊的能力，即它们可以被制成单独的物质。我的解释遵循了亚里士多德的普遍观点，即物质主要是实质性变化的基础。然而，我不同意传统解释的某些方面，特别是对物质在实质性变化中持续存在的传统理解。我主张，物质在实质性变化中的持久性，不能与个别物质在偶然变化中的持久性相提并论。我认为亚里士多德将物质与可感知的事物区分开来的建议，与亚里士多德的物质是抽象原理的传统解释相反，也反对流行的观点，即亚里士多德的物质是严格的相对术语，不是指世界上的一个实体或一类实体，而是指定任何可能发生某种变化的东西。

Aristotle is often credited with having introduced the concept of matter (gr. hylê) into philosophy. However, it is not entirely clear what "matter" means in his texts. Aristotle's definitions and specifications seem obscure and sometimes even inconsistent. Also scholars have reached quite opposite results; their interpretations range from the view that Aristotelian matter is an abstract metaphysical principle that never exists in actuality to the position that matter is always a particular sensible stuff which constitutes an individual substance, for example bronze or flesh and bone.The special focus of my investigation lies on the question of why Aristotle introduces the concept of matter, i.e. which ontological problems he tries to solve by introducing and further specifying this concept. I argue that Aristotle introduces matter in order to explain the coming-to-be of individual substances. His theory thus not only opposes those views which generally deny the possibility of change, but is in particular set against positions which describe the occurrence of a new individual not as a case of substantial change, but either as an accidental modification of one singular matter, or as a new combination of qualities. According to Aristotle, we can only understand the occurrence of a new individual as a case of substantial change if we have an adequate concept of matter. In a substantial change, matter is that from which an individual substance emerges and which continues to exist - in a particular way yet to be described - in that individual substance. I further argue that Aristotle identifies the so-conceived matter with sensible stuff; typical examples he gives include bronze or the catamenia. They are not individual substances, but they have the peculiar capacity that they can be made into an individual substance.My interpretation follows the common view that matter in Aristotle is primarily the substratum of substantial change. However, I disagree with certain aspects of the traditional interpretation, in particular with the traditional understanding of matter's persistence in substantial change. I claim that matter's persistence in substantial change must not be compared with the persistence of an individual substance in accidental change. My suggestion that Aristotle identifies matter with sensible stuff opposes the traditional interpretation according to which Aristotelian matter is an abstract principle, as well as the popular view according to which Aristotelian matter is a strictly relative term which does not refer to an entity or a class of entities in the world, but designates whatever is subject to a certain change.